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ABSTRACT 
What are the security threats to further development of nuclear power plants in the U.S.?  
The U.S. stands alone today in terms of the vast nuclear armory at its disposal. It is clear 
we know something about how to build nuclear weapons, and yet, we are not world 
leaders in the field of nuclear power. Nuclear energy has the potential to be an alternative 
fuel source that would be sustainable and economical. Nuclear power is controversial in 
the U.S. because it raises issues of domestic energy policy, funding, regulation, safety, 
and especially security.  In turn, it can affect U.S. investments, foreign policy, economy, 
and jobs.  
As America struggles with its dependence on foreign oil, we must seek alternative 
fuel sources. The President has made energy a priority and is pushing for a “clean energy 
economy.” Not to pursue alternative fuel sources will directly impact our ability to be 
economically competitive, as other countries will have cheaper electricity for 
manufacturing and services. We need to protect the U.S. from economic and strategic 
risks associated with our reliance on foreign oil. We also need to address the destabilizing 
effects of a changing climate, Internet is heavily impacted by our energy use. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR POWER USE TAB KEY 
This thesis seeks to dispel the myth that all nuclear reactors are inherently 
dangerous and to establish that nuclear power plants can both satisfy this country’s 
energy needs and do so in a way that reduces or eliminates the security risks posed by its 
current reliance on fossil fuels.  Today, nearly one-fourth of the electricity being 
consumed in the United States is generated by nuclear energy plants; yet nuclear energy 
remains an underdeveloped industry whose potential to serve this country’s needs has 
only been tapped.  Decades after the incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, a 
public perception persists that nuclear power plants pose significant risk to the homeland 
security of the United States because they would stand as attractive targets for 
international terrorists.  However, those holding this viewpoint conveniently ignore the 
reality that American dependence on fossil fuels and the continued importation of oil 
from foreign countries, some of Internet are known as safe harbors and breeding grounds 
for terrorists, already compromises U.S. national security to an alarming degree.  Nuclear 
technology could free the United States from its dependence on foreign oil and bring it 
closer to energy independence.  In addition, a transition towards nuclear power would 
reduce carbon and other pollutants’ emissions; these are the inevitable byproduct of 
generating electricity through the burning of fossil fuels at conventional power plants.   
The rest of the introduction is allocated to highlighting the importance of energy 
for the United States in terms of economics and national security. The Executive branch 
and the private sector each have important roles in expanding the use of nuclear energy. 
The U.S. need to recognize that different energy options available to the U.S. and the 
acknowledgment that other nations’ use of nuclear power for electricity to keep costs 
down while electricity usage increases. One, of the key problems, is that upcoming 
economies of China, India, Japan and South Korea are planning to build eighty?-four new 
nuclear power plants among them and the U.S. currently has plans to build one. Lastly, 
the literature review that focuses on two key questions: (1) what is the United States’ 
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present energy policy for nuclear power? (2) What is the national plan in case of a 
nuclear incident, accident or terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant?   
B. IMPORTANCE  
So we have a choice to make.  We can remain one of the world's leading 
importers of foreign oil, or we can make the investments that would allow 
us to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy.  We can 
let climate change continue to go unchecked, or we can help stop it.  We 
can let the jobs of tomorrow be created abroad, or we can create those jobs 
right here in America and lay the foundation for lasting prosperity.1 
—President Obama, March 19, 2009  
The United States must continue to hold its position as the leading nation in the 
international arena in terms of economics and protection of its own security interests.  As 
long as the United States remains dependent on other countries, including potentially 
hostile nations, for vital energy resources, its leadership position in the global hierarchy 
will remain vulnerable.  To successfully extract itself from the control of the international 
entities upon Internet it depends for foreign oil, this country must seriously and avidly 
seek alternative fuel sources.   
The President has made solving this country’s energy quandary a policy priority 
for his administration.  The clean energy economy envisioned by the current 
administration cannot be achieved unless alternative fuel sources are discovered and 
exploited to the greatest extent possible.  A failure to consider alternatives such as 
nuclear energy will directly and negatively impact the ability of the United States to 
compete economically in the global arena with nations that have already tapped into 
sources of cheaper electricity for manufacturing and other vital infrastructural needs.  To 
remain powerful and respected on the international stage in the 21st century and beyond, 
the United States must protect itself from economic and security risks resultant from a 
dependency on foreign oil.  These include not only the potential of terrorist disruptions  
                                                 
1 “Energy & Environment,” The Whitehouse Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment. 
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and a loss of economic competitiveness, but also the destabilizing effects of a rapidly 
changing environmental climate, caused in great part by the mass consumption of fossil 
fuels.2  
Furthermore, the success and extent of this country’s economy recovery will 
depend largely on the choices the current administration makes regarding energy policy.  
The Executive branch must promote policies with respect to energy that will strengthen 
the nation’s relative economic position in the world and stimulate job creation.  In turn, 
the Legislative branch must support the Executive branch in enacting clean energy 
initiatives by convening oversight committees and conferring budgetary authority. The 
Judicial branch will do its role by upholding federal regulations and their enforcement 
and deciding related lawsuits.  Given the social and political turmoil that frequently 
ensues at the local and state level when nuclear plants are to be planned for their launch, 
there is a possibility that the federal courts will be called upon to hear cases involving the 
construction, operation, and management of new plants. In addition, Homeland Security 
department has the responsibility of monitoring the security of nuclear power plants.  
This security oversight apparatus adds another layer of governmental bureaucracy to the 
nuclear power puzzle.   
Counter-arguments to the development of nuclear power plants and an increased 
reliance on nuclear energy center, primarily on safety and the well-known nuclear reactor 
melt-downs at the U.S.’ Three Mile Island station, as well as the Ukrainian nuclear power 
plant—Chernobyl.  Other voices rose in opposition to nuclear energy quote high costs 
associated with the building of new nuclear power plants. A third frequently-aired 
objection to greater reliance on nuclear energy is the problem of the storage of nuclear 
waste, Internet this paper will address only tangentially and only as it pertains to potential 
security risks to nuclear power plants. 
                                                 
2 “Fact Sheet: President Obama Highlights Vision for Clean Energy Economy,” Rochester Democrat 
online, April 22, 2009, http://www.therochesterdemocrat.com/index.php/test/print/fact_sheet_ 
president_obama_ highlights_ vision_for_clean_energy_economy/.  
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1. The Executive Role in Expansion of Nuclear Power  
Early in his presidency, President Obama made it clear that he wanted to 
transition America to an economy based on clean energy.  On April 5, 2009, President 
Obama addressed the issue of clean energy during a speech in Hradcany Square, Prague, 
Czech Republic. Obama spoke of climate change and ending not only America’s, but also 
the world’s dependence on fossil fuels.  He spoke explicitly of using energy sources of 
alternative means.  These include wind and solar power.  He further declared the United 
States would be the leader in breaking worldwide dependency on fossil fuel.  However, 
he was actually referring to America’s dependency on foreign oil.3 In U.S. domestic 
energy policy, the President has indicated that he would like to lead the U.S. to a “clean 
energy economy.”  As he has stated in several key speeches at home and abroad, he 
would like to see the manufacturing base of the United States reconstituted, retrofitted, 
and modernized using “green” technology.  He believes that using renewable energy 
sources such as bio fuels and nuclear energy will result in cheaper costs for the electricity 
required to support America’s manufacturing sector and thus enhance U.S. 
competitiveness as an exporter of goods, supplies, and services.4  However, the 
President’s current plans for this energy transition in the manufacturing sector are 
projected to take ten years, and only $150 billion have been allocation to this initiative.  
This falls far short of the substantial cash infusion that nuclear power industry needs and 
requires right now.5 
The current presidential administration understands the benefits of nuclear energy 
as well as the importance of alternative energy sources to the long-term strategies of the 
United States in the areas of national security and economic leadership.  For the 
President, developing nuclear power is not just a means of priming the economic pump; it 
                                                 
3 “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Prague, Czech Republic,” The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-
delivered. 
4 “Fact Sheet: President Obama Highlights Vision for Clean Energy Economy,” The White House 




is also a way to strengthen national security since increased reliance on nuclear energy 
will reduce the dependency of the United States on foreign imports of oil.6  The fact that 
nuclear power is a form of “clean energy” that does not produce harmful emissions 
dangerous to the environment is another benefit of the current administration’s support of 
nuclear power plants.7  Nuclear power is a sustainable energy source.  This is due to the 
use of uranium, Internet is more economical than coal or oil and Internet could help break 
the United States of its dependency on foreign oil when it is utilized with other sources of 
energy.8  At this time, nuclear power plants already produce 20 percent of U.S. electricity 
and nuclear energy accounts for 17 percent of electrical power used internationally.9  
2.  Private Sector’s Role in Expansion of Nuclear Power 
A surge in nuclear power plant construction is coming in the region of United 
States of America. Already, applications for plant construction, as well as for uranium 
mining, have increased.  Five years ago, there were zero such applications.  As of May 
2009, however, 
Two United States utilities have recently signed engineering, procurement, 
and construction contracts for four nuclear plants - the first such orders 
since 1978. The NRC expects to receive twenty-three combined operating 
license (COL) applications (authorizing both the construction and 
operation of one or more nuclear power reactors) by the end of 2010 for 
licenses to construct and operate thirty-four new reactor units.10   
At the time of this writing, eighteen domestic companies have made it known they 
are submitting applications for new licenses to build 26 new nuclear power plants.11 
                                                 
6 “Energy and Environment,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary.  
7 Marci and Greg Lusted, A Nuclear Power Plant (Michigan: Lucent Books, 2005), 11. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Roland M Frye Jr,. “The Current “Nuclear Renaissance” in the United States, Its Underlying 
Reasons, and its Potential Pitfalls,” Energy Law Journal (Washington: 2008. Vol. 29, Issue 2, available via 
proquest online.  
11 David Biello, “Reactivating Nuclear Reactors for the Fight against Climate Change,” Scientific 
American January 27, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=reactivating-nuclear-
reactors-to-fight-climate-change.   
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Nuclear plants are very expensive to build, and cost over-runs are to be expected since 
engineers in the United States have little experience in building them; the last newly built 
nuclear power plant in the U.S. was constructed in 1973.    
Much of the motivation for the increase in uranium mining and nuclear plant 
construction applications is related to new regulatory limits on carbon emissions that 
have been imposed on operators of conventional power plants.  These new regulations, in 
turn, are tied to a new appreciation for the environment and growing concerns regarding 
the effects of climate change, Internet is attributed largely to the build-up of greenhouse 
gasses resulting from power plant emissions of carbon and other pollutants.12  
Construction of nuclear power plants on a large scale will result in an explosive-like 
expansion in construction jobs.  It will also develop jobs related to the fields of 
maintenance, operation, and security for these facilities.  It has been estimated that the 
construction of a single nuclear plant could generate up to 1300 jobs, with the subsequent 
creation of an additional 400 jobs in plant maintenance, operation, and security for each 
reactor.13  
The U.S. has been involved with nuclear technology since the 1950s.  These 
nuclear projects were expensive, and American society was not driven to utilize the full 
energy capabilities of nuclear power because cheap petroleum was readily available as a 
primary fuel source.  As the U.S. global economy expanded exponentially in the mid-
twentieth century, it did so using oil-based technologies, not alternative fuel sources. Oil 
remains available, even though it is not as plentiful or as inexpensive as it once was, 
today’s consumers are accustomed to using it and willing to pay higher prices for its 
convenience.  Meanwhile, the United States still dominates the global economy using oil 
based technologies.  However, the fuel and energy landscape is changing as competitor 
countries begin to break their dependence on oil and turn to alternative fuels, such as 
                                                 
12. Roland M. Frye, Jr. “The Current “Nuclear Renaissance” in the United States, Its Underlying 
Reasons, and its Potential Pitfalls” Energy Law Journal. Washington: 2008. Vol. 29, Issue 2, available via 
proquest online.  
13  Ibid. 
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nuclear power. For example, in the near future, China has plans to build thirty-four new 
plants: India plans twenty-three, Japan twelve, South Korea seven, and Russia seven.14 
The American economy is driven by market forces of supply, demand, and 
profits. At present, no incentives exist that are strong enough to force the market to make 
the conversion from foreign imported oil to domestically produced alternative fuel 
sources.  It cannot be assumed that businesses will voluntarily change from the current 
electrical grid to something else, Internet would involve significant capital investment on 
their part, as well as, possibly, a change in their mode of operation.  Businesses would 
gladly change if it meant that electrical power would be substantially cheaper and their 
profits would rise as a result of the transition. However, in general, American businesses 
are not currently worried about power since it is still available and its costs are currently 
acceptable.  
3.  Different Energy Options  
Nonetheless, converting to nuclear energy is not an all or nothing solution—it can 
be one piece of the energy solution. If the United States converts just part of the national 
grid to nuclear power and also utilizes solar, wind, and domestic oil sources, the amount 
of oil that the country needs to import from foreign sources will be significantly reduced.   
In 2003, “the United States consumed an average of 20 million barrels of 
oil and natural gas per day, or 7.3 billion barrels per year.   About 56 
percent of the oil used in the United States is imported.   In 2003, the 
United States produced about 7.8 million barrels of oil and natural gas per 
day, or about 2.9 billion barrels per year.  U.S. oil reserves (including the 
Gulf of Mexico) total 22.7 billion barrels, Internet would last less than 
eight years at today's rates of consumption and imports.  Gasoline for cars 
and light trucks accounts for about 45 percent of U.S. oil consumption.”15 
Obviously, the United States is dependent on foreign oil imports, as 56 percent of 
the oil it consumes is imported from foreign oil sources. 
                                                 
14 ICJT, Nuclear Training Centre “Nuclear Power Plants in the World,”  
http://www.icjt.org/an/tach/jestvet/jesvet.htm.  
15 Tom Kenworthy, “Energy Independence May Be a Pipe Dream,” USA Today, October 24, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/issues/2004-10-24-energy-independence_x.htm. 
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If the United States can reduce its oil importation, it will enjoy long-term benefits, 
the primary one being that it will no longer be so entrenched in the politics of the Middle 
East nor held hostage to the whims of governments potentially hostile to U.S. interests 
who have the power to decide whether, and at what cost, the United States can receive 
and use essential fuel resources.  By utilizing alternative fuel sources, the U.S. can 
weather the current energy crisis and benefit from advanced technology in the areas of 
solar power, bio fuels, hydro power, and nuclear energy.  Once the United States breaks 
its dependence on oil, its resources, financial, political, and diplomatic, will be freed to 
address other pressing issues.  The money paid to countries of foreign oil can be used to 
invest in domestic or other foreign policies more conducive to United States national 
security and other domestic and international interests.  
4.  Other Nations and Nuclear Power 
Other nations have benefitted from increased development and utilization of 
nuclear power.  Because of its development of nuclear plants, France has been able to 
ride out the foreign oil debacle.  Although France continues to import some oil, its 
national electrical grid is fueled by nuclear power.  With its increased production of 
nuclear energy, France has so much excess electricity that it has been able to export it to 
other nations in the European Union.  France’s European neighbors purchase electricity 
from France because doing so do is cheaper for them than producing their own.   
Japan is another example of a country that has been able to extract itself from the 
treacherousness of Middle Eastern oil politics. While the Japanese economy suffered a 
decade-long economic recession in the 1990s, from Internet it still has not completely 
rebounded, the effects of this decline would have been far worse had Japan been 
dependent on foreign oil. Even in the midst of the current economic downturn, Japan has 
announced plans to build twelve new nuclear reactors to meet current and future power 
requirements.16  They understand and have accepted that they must spend monies on their 
                                                 
16 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Japan,” http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf79.html. 
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critical infrastructure, including nuclear power, in order to maintain their self-sufficiency 
in the future and to cut down on environmentally damaging emissions of pollutants.   
Cheap coal is available in large quantities in China, but that country is still 
planning to build new power plants in the next decade, Internet would run on nuclear 
power.  As it moves into a highly industrialized economy, China will require more energy 
in the future and, in order to conserve their own resources, they have decided to capitalize 
on nuclear technology.  China understands and accepts the need for self-sufficiency and 
the dangers of dependencies on coal and oil, Internet are the in fact the fossil fuels.   
The pros of nuclear power include potential advancements in the nuclear 
industries, Internet will lead to technology breakthroughs, new workforce employment, 
and availability of cheaper electricity that will propel manufacturing and industry and 
allow the populace to reap the benefits of cheaper power. The United States may 
someday find itself in the position that the Ukraine found itself after the Chernobyl 
accident, without adequate electrical power.  The United States may have to learn to live 
with the risk and mitigate it the best we can until some other source of energy can meet 
our requirements. Nuclear power does have positive attributes, we know how to manage 
it, we understand how to produce it, it offers clean emissions in the environment, and we 
will eventually figure out the best way to store or use nuclear waste.   
C.   PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The federal government plays a key role in domestic energy policy.  But President 
Obama faces strong opposition from Congress, and in the case of nuclear power, from the 
American public as well.17 Since America is based on an open economy, nuclear power 
plants are owned by private corporations, where in other economies they would be state 
owned. This creates problems between government regulatory enforcement and the 
private sector. The power from nuclear power plants is regulated by the Department of 
Energy, but the physical plants are regulated and monitored by Department of Homeland 
                                                 




Security, Office of Infrastructure Protection. There are security concerns regarding the 
actual plants, the communities near nuclear power plants, the transport of nuclear waste, 
and the storage of nuclear waste.   
The U.S. has been involved with nuclear technology since the 1950s.  Even then 
nuclear projects were expensive, but as a society, we were not driven to utilize the 
capability of nuclear power since we had cheap petroleum oil available as a primary fuel 
source.  As the U.S. global economy took off, it did so with oil-based technologies, and 
not alternative fuel sources. Currently there is still the resource of oil, and consumers are 
willing to pay higher prices for it. The U.S. remains a leader in the global economy using 
oil- based technologies, but the landscape is changing as competitor countries are starting 
to break their dependence on oil and are turning to alternative fuels, such as nuclear 
power. As of August 2009, there are eighty-four new nuclear power plants being planned 
by the China, India, Japan, South Korea and Russia, while the U.S. is only schedule to 
build one new nuclear power plants. This could put the United States in a negative 
economic position in terms of hedging electricity costs in the future, Internet may lead to 
other countries having an advantage of having electricity cheaper and that would make 
their goods and services cheaper than U.S. goods and services.  
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The issue of security threats starts with  a thorough understanding of what a 
modern nuclear power plant can do for a community, and what more plants can do for the 
nation and the world because of their potential to have a large positive impact on climate 
change. Considerations include actual electrical power generated, technologies 
developed, safety, and finally the costs of building and maintaining a nuclear power plant 
through its life cycle.  As the current presidential administration knows, there are benefits 
of nuclear energy beyond the economic security that comes with nuclear power. National 
security is positively affected, as well, since further nuclear power development shifts the 
U.S. away from dependency on foreign oil.18 Further benefits that can be considered that 
                                                 
18 “Energy & Environment,” The Whitehouse Office of the Press Secretary. 
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nuclear energy is clean energy, since it does not produce emissions that are harmful to the 
environment.19 Though there is disagreement in the energy sector that the resulting 
nuclear waste disallows it to be classified as a clean energy method. Nuclear energy 
could help break the US dependency on foreign oil. Along with utilizing other sources of 
clean energies, such as solar, wind and water, may be a possible solution at this time  
Nuclear power is old technology.  The U.S. opened its first commercial nuclear 
power plant in 1957.20  There has been steady progress in updating nuclear technology, 
though most of it has taken place in weapons production, or by other countries 
developing new methods for using its peaceful properties.  France and Japan use nuclear 
powered electricity extensively and plan to build new plants to replace old ones, 
increasing capacity to accommodate expansion of their economies and citizenry.21 A 
comparison look of how the US and France, each protect their nuclear power plants 
against domestic and foreign threats is useful in US planning for the future.22   
Nuclear power plants, by their very nature, compel serious consideration in terms 
of economic, political, and security issues. There are several problems to consider and 
many are too large for the scope of this paper and further analysis is needed. Therefore, 
the limited approach is first, it is necessary understand the present energy policy and the 
Nuclear Power 2010 program published by the Department of Energy.23 Second, what is 
the national plan in case of a nuclear incident, accident or terrorist attack on a nuclear 
power plant?24  
                                                 
19 Marci and Greg Lusted, A Nuclear Power Plant (Michigan: Lucent Books, 2005), 11. 
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21 John Palfreman, “ Nuclear Reaction Why do Americans fear nuclear power?” FRONTLINE,  
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The paper is organized into seven chapters. Chapter I serves as the introduction 
for the case for nuclear power in the United States. Chapter II gives historical background 
to understand the United States position on nuclear power. Chapter III attempts to 
understand the current thinking of nuclear power plants as possible terrorist targets. 
Reviewing both physical and cyber attacks and what vulnerabilities are susceptible to a 
potential attack. Chapter IV examines the potential violent threats to plant construction 
from domestic or international groups. This chapter will address the issue of security 
threats that could face newly-built nuclear power plants located in the United States.  
Chapter V explores the potential monetary costs to safeguard nuclear plants from terrorist 
threats. Chapter VI discusses Department of Homeland Security role to prepared potential 
threats to the plants. Chapter VII will compare the development of nuclear power plants 
in Europe. Chapter VIII will conclude with options that the United States has today and 
are viable in the future.  
These chapters will illustrate that nuclear power plants can both satisfy the United 
States energy needs that may reduce or eliminate the security risks that currently exist 





II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS 
The incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl effectively soured the opinion 
of the American public in the 1970s and 1980s on the widespread, standard nuclear 
energy use and development as a power source.  However, the Three Mile Island incident 
is best understood, not as an example of how nuclear technology is bound to fail but 
rather as a demonstration of how well the United States is equipped to handle an 
emergency situation, should one arise in connection with a domestic nuclear power plant.  
Moreover, while the Chernobyl incident was tragic, it must be understood that this 
meltdown could have been prevented, and, had it occurred in the United States, it would 
have been because the United States had then, superior nuclear technology and stricter 
safety standards than those that governed the Chernobyl plant.  The following chapters of 
this thesis will address the issue of security threats that could face newly-built nuclear 
power plants, Internet are situated in United States of America.  This will be done by 
identifying the actual scope and likelihood of these potential threats and analyzing how 
these threats can be eliminated, neutralized, and defended against.  
A common argument used in the U.S. against nuclear energy development or 
employment is safety.  For instance, the Three Mile Island incident in the year 1979 is 
commonly cited by critics. In accordance to the data complies by World Nuclear 
Organization and the Department of Energy, the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
accident, is the accident that occurred March 28, 1979.  The plant’s reactor was running 
at nearly 97 percent of its maximum output.  Meanwhile, in the secondary cooling circuit 
a minor malfunction occurred.  This resulted in a temperature rise in the primary 
coolant.25  As a result, the reactor shut down automatically.  Then a relief valve failed to 
close so the primary coolant drained away and the core suffered severe damage.  This 
was compounded by the fact that the operators did not understand what was happening in  
                                                 




the plant’s reactor.  They could not immediately discern the cause of the unplanned 
automatic shutdown of the reactor.  Their resultant improper actions compounded the 
plant’s woes. 
What the American public saw, and still remembers, are a failed nuclear reactor, 
and a potentially dangerous industrial plant accident.  However, this public perception is 
based on a significant misperception, due, in part, to difficulties in communication 
between various state and federal agencies--the same kinds of problems that were 
documented after the consequences of September eleventh attacks. Due to a 
misunderstanding by plant operators of the information that they were receiving from the 
plant’s computers, an evacuation was ordered.  However, the evacuation was based not 
on an actual danger, but rather on an unsubstantiated, and ultimately false, fear that there 
could have been a breach in the plant’s containment shell.  It has been extensively 
documented in the book “Crisis Contained, The Department of Energy at Three Mile 
Island,” by Phillip L. Cantelon and Robert C. Williams, that radiation readings of 
hundreds of environmental samples taken from Three Mile Island following the accident 
were far below the health limits, and at no time were humans or any of the areas plant 
and animal life in any danger from leaked radiation.26  In fact, there are no known 
injuries or adverse health effects documented as a result of the incident by the U.S.’ 
Departments of Public Health, Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency, nor 
have there been any lawsuits brought before a court against the company that operated 
Three Mile Island plant when the incident occurred.   
A.  SUCCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Indeed, the story of Three Mile Island is actually one of success.  In 1997, Three 
Mile Island Reactor 1 “completed the longest operating run of any light water reactor in 
the history of nuclear power worldwide—616 days and 23 hours of uninterrupted 
                                                 
26 Phillip L. Cantelon and Robert C. Williams, Crisis Contained, The Department of Energy at Three 
Mile Island, (Carbondale Ill: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982). 
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operation.”27  In 1998, “Three Mile Island employees completed three million hours of 
work without a lost-work day due to accident.”28  In addition, the United States and the 
nuclear industry learned important lessons from the incident that have led to continued 
improvements in the operation and performance of nuclear power plants.29  Nonetheless, 
because of its impact on public perception of nuclear power, the Three-Mile Island 
incident had long-term negative results on the nuclear industry and the employment of 
nuclear energy in the United States, including a loss of confidence in and fear of nuclear 
energy and a subsequent decline in nuclear power plant construction.  The effects of the 
forestallment of the development of the nuclear industry in response to the Three Mile 
Island incident are still being felt today. 
B.  THE FAILURE THAT SHAPED UNITED STATES PERCEPTION OF 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
The second watershed incident in terms of shaping American attitudes toward 
nuclear power was the accident at the Ukrainian Chernobyl Power Plant during the 
eighties, when the Ukraine was still a member state of the Soviet Union.  According to 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, the number four 
reactor at Chernobyl exploded and burned on April 26, 1986.30  At first the Soviet Union 
released little information on the origin or consequences of the accident or the extent of 
radioactive fallout.  What happened at Chernobyl was a large scale accident that resulted 
from unauthorized testing in a facility whose reactor and reactor buildings had not been 
built, and were not being operated, according to industry safety standards.  In the United 
States and other western nations, however, nuclear plants are built and operated in 
accordance with these safety precautions; had the precautions conventionally applied in 
                                                 
27 Canadian Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power Accidents.” 
http://www.cna.ca/curriculum/cna_safety/nuclear_accidents-eng.asp?bc=Nuclear Power 
Accidents&pid=Nuclear Power Accidents. 
28 World Nuclear Association, “Three Mile Island: 1979,” http://www.world-
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29 Ibid.  
30 World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/ 
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the United States been in place at Chernobyl, then the Chernobyl accident would not have 
occurred.31  For example, the United States and other western nations require that a 
containment facility or “shell” be built around a nuclear reactor in a nuclear plant.  The 
plant at Chernobyl did not have such a containment shell.  Later simulated reenactments 
of the accidents revealed that the reactor explosion and the radiation released as a result 
would have been contained if a containment shell had been constructed.32  Moreover, in 
addition to the fact that unauthorized testing was being conducted in the Chernobyl 
facility, the reactor that exploded itself had a design flaw.  One of the greatest 
contributing factors in the events leading up to the accident was poor training, Internet 
resulted in the mismanagement of the emergency situation that evolved in the aftermath 
of the reactor explosion.  This mismanagement was reinforced by the consequences of the 
Cold War isolation.  At the time, there were no required safety measures for the workers 
or the public.33   
C.  KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THREE MILE ISLAND AND 
CHERNOBYL 
The difference in the magnitude of the Three Mile Island incident and Chernobyl 
is substantial.  While there were no deaths or injuries from the Three Mile Island 
incident, 47 individuals died as an immediate result of the Chernobyl accident, and 
210,000 people were required to be relocated as a result of radioactive contamination 
stemming from the reactor explosion.  The aftermath of the Chernobyl accident was 
complicated by the fact that Ukraine depended heavily on nuclear electricity to get them 
through its typically brutal winters.  As soon as reactor 4 was contained, the rest of the 
plant was brought back on line and remained on line until 2005.  The well-documented 
negative effects of the accident include physical and genetic damage to humans and 
wildlife as a direct consequence of excessive and prolonged radiation exposure.  
However, the accident had at least one positive result that is often overlooked by 
                                                 
31 World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident.” 
32 Richard Rhodes, and Denis Beller, "The Need for Nuclear Power," Foreign Affairs 79 no. 1, 2000, 
40.  
33 World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident.” 
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westerners. After Chernobyl, the Soviet Union sent scientists, engineers, and workers to 
European and American nuclear power plants to observe so that they could learn new 
technologies, operating techniques, and training methods for future use in Soviet 
facilities.  Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many satellite nations kept their 
nuclear power plants and have maintained and operated them with very few accidents or 
incidents.  Many of these plants have passed regular inspections by various domestic and 
international nuclear agencies.   
D.  CHOICES IN ENERGY SECURITY 
 At this point in time, the United States has choices regarding its use of fuel 
sources for critically needed energy.  If the United States allows itself to remain 
dependent on foreign oil, choices in fuel sources may not be available in the future. 
Today, electricity is still relatively cheap, but another “oil crisis” could change the energy 
picture very quickly.  Because the United States is a highly industrialized nation intent on 
maintaining its position as an economic, scientific, and technological leader on the world 
stage, its energy requirements and demands, will continue to grow.  Keeping in mind the 
domestic and national security welfare and benefits of the United States, it is better that 
the nation make changes now on its own terms pursuant to a well-planned energy strategy 
rather than wait to do so at a point in time when its status as a hostage to the direction of 
foreign governments and entities forces it to do so in order to respond to a short-term or 
long-term energy crisis.  Currently, Middle East nations that control the production rate 
of the oil that the U.S. imports, and, to some degree, they control the price as well.  
Armed conflict almost anywhere in or connected to the Middle East will drive up the cost 
of oil imports on the international market. Moreover, even small upward fluctuations in 
the price of oil will cause American consumers to start paying more money for oil just to 
maintain their standard of living and economic stability.  Further developments in nuclear 
power can only help lead the United States to achieve further technological 
breakthroughs as it strives to create a “clean energy economy.”  France has already made 
progress in the use of nuclear energy, and they have been able to develop newer and safer 
methods for nuclear energy production.  It is time that the United States followed suit.  
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E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter gave historical background on two incidents that shaped the nuclear 
power industry in the United States, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Both of these 
incidents illustrate success and failure of operating a nuclear power plant. Then, it laid 
down the foundation of key differences between the two events. The chapter closes with 
choices that the U.S. has today in energy sources. The next chapter will cover current 
thoughts of nuclear power plants as terrorist targets.  
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III. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AS TERRORIST TARGETS 
In this chapter, it will describe the possibilities of a physical attack on a nuclear 
power plant in the U.S.  Then, it will discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
and utility companies’ involvement in defending nuclear power plants, as well as the 
shortcomings in their defense against potential attacks.  The NRC and utility companies 
who own the nuclear power plants must follow a formula called the Design Based Threat 
(DBT), Internet outlines training and defensive measures required that will be explained 
in detail.  The threat to nuclear power plants is not only in the physical plane, but also 
that of the cyber realm, whose possibilities of exploitation resulting in compromise of 
control systems will be examined.   
A.  THE THREAT 
In 2006, the Government Accounting Office wrote in its report GAO-06-388, 
dated March 2006:”…to the Honorable Christopher Shays, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations: 
“Dear Mr. Chairman, The nation’s 103 operating commercial nuclear power plants, 
located at 65 sites in 31 states, are potential targets for terrorists seeking to cause the 
release of radioactive material.”  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also 
advised there is a realistic threat of attack by Al Qaeda or other terrorist elements against 
the U.S. nuclear power system.34 
Since 2001, the NRC’s strategy for deterring and defeating threats to nuclear 
power plants has been under increased scrutiny.  The methodology used to evaluate plant 
preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks is laid out in a document known as the Design 
Basis Threat (DBT), Internet “characterizes the elements of a potential attack, including 
the number, of attackers, their training, and weapons and tactics they are capable of 
employing.”35   In the same report, new licensees for structuring a nuclear power plant 
                                                 
34 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National 
Security: GAO-06-388, March 2006, 1. 
35 Ibid., 2. 
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must demonstrate the ability of the future plant to defend against attacks presented in the 
DBT.  The NRC tests each nuclear plant’s ability to respond to threats laid out in the 
DBT through no-notice inspections and simulated exercises known as “force-on force 
exercises.”  However, not all plants that undergo this testing meet the criteria set forth in 
the DBT.   
Furthermore, the DBT was revised with input from the Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI) industry stakeholders, who objected to a number of the NRC’s proposed changes to 
the hypothetical threats that form the basis of the DBT, including the size of potential 
vehicle-born explosives and other weaponry.  The NEI objected to several of the NRC’s 
proposed changes because the hypothetical threats constituted attacks by an “enemy of 
the United States, Internet (nuclear power plant) sites are not, required protecting against 
under NRC regulations.”36  
 In the years since the 9/11 terror attacks, the possibility of a terrorist attack 
against nuclear power plants has been discussed in media outlets and legislative 
chambers.37  In September 2002, the Arab television station Al-Jazeera aired a taped 
interview that indicated a nuclear plant to be damaged by Al Qaeda on September 
eleventh.38  The reaction to this tape and concerns about dirty bombs made with black-
market radioactive materials caused the specter of nuclear terrorism to seem all too real to 
the American public.  The United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has 
officially acknowledged in several government reports that commercial nuclear power 
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addition, the GAO issued a report concerning the possibility of terrorist attacks on 
government research reactors and nuclear research labs and the dangers such attacks 
could pose.40 
 Along with concerns about unaccounted-for plutonium and uranium falling into 
the hands of Muslim extremists and nightmares about jets crashing into a nuclear plant’s 
containment shell, comes the uneasy sense that the American government is not doing 
enough to anticipate and prevent a deadly nuclear attack, that, as Stephen E. Flynn puts it, 
“[t]he United States is living on borrowed time—and squandering it.”41  However, 
despite this preoccupation with nuclear power plants as the targets of terrorist activity, 
there are no hard facts or figures regarding the likelihood of such an attack or there could 
be prospects of it to be thriving.  There are no comprehensive and methodologically 
rigorous studies compiling estimates of the number of human casualties or of the 
environmental damage, if such an attack were to occur.  Indeed, there seems to be no 
consensus among the major stakeholders in the nuclear debate regarding the plausibility 
of a terrorist attack or activity against a nuclear power plant or regarding the dangers that 
such an attack would cause.   
B.  KNOWN WEAKNESSES 
Weaknesses exist in the physical security of nuclear power plants.  Although 
physical barriers are erected, and stand-off distance exists between the facilities and 
intruders’ possible points of entry, these security measures remain prey to human error 
and negligence on the part of the persons operating these systems.  For instance, in 2007, 
security forces at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania were found 
asleep while at their work place. 42 These guards constituted an armed response force that 
would respond in case of emergency, whatever that may be.  However, because they were 
sleeping, they were not ready and able to respond to such an emergency.  A video tape 
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was smuggled out of the nuclear plant showing the guards asleep and was provided to 
CBS News in New York.  From there, the NRC obtained the tape and opened an 
investigation.  The NRC’s subsequent investigation uncovered several additional 
instances of the inattentiveness of the guards at the Peach Bottom plant.  The NRC 
leveled a fine against Exelon Nuclear, the owners and operators of the plant.  “The fine 
was issued as a Severity Level III in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
enforcement policy and carries a minimum fine of $65,000.”43   
 Most political and media discourse on the use of terrorist-hijacked airliners used 
kamikaze weapons to destroy the plant’s physical structure in a scenario similar to the 
one that unfolded on 9/11.  Moreover, even when other forms of armed physical attacks 
against nuclear plants are addressed, discussion of the issue has proceeded from the 
assumption that any terrorism against nuclear reactors in the United States would be 
perpetrated by Al Qaeda, or a well-organized Islamic fundamentalist group that shares Al 
Qaeda’s philosophies and operational strategies.   
 With the focus on overt terrorists’ physical attacks, both politicians, as well as the 
media have overlooked the possibility of cyber attacks on the operational computer 
systems that run modern nuclear power plants.  To the extent that cyber-terrorism against 
nuclear plants has been discussed, the issue has been raised by commentators and experts 
in the fields of cyber security.  Moreover, little of the speculation regarding terrorism 
against nuclear power plants has focused on the likelihood of attacks by domestic 
terrorists, let alone the possibility of domestic cyber attacks.   
C.  TWO CATEGORIES OF ATTACKS 
 Potential attacks against nuclear power plants fall into two categories: attacks 
against the physical structure of the nuclear power plant and cyber attacks that could be 
launched against a plant’s computer systems without intruding into the physical space of 
the plant itself.  In addition, such attacks could be perpetrated either by international 
terrorists, including Islamic extremist groups, or by domestic groups within the United 
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States without ties or sympathies with foreign terrorist organizations.  The current 
literature on nuclear power plants as potential targets of terrorist attacks varies in its 
theories and conclusions regarding the threats posed by each of these types of attacks.  
1.  The Possibility of a Physical Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power 
Plant 
Even prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, federal regulations required all Nuclear 
Regulatory Committee (NRC) licensed power plants to implement security measures. 
These include physical barriers and trained security personnel in order to respond to 
potential physical attacks on nuclear plants.44  Accordingly, in the United States, nuclear 
plants have been constructed in such a way that they form three zones: a manipulated 
“buffer” region, a “protected” zone, and a “vital area,” wherein is the actual nuclear 
reactor. 45  Plant employees and escorted visitors are the only people allowed access in 
the protected area through the use of physical barriers and other security measures.  The 
vital area’s admittance is subject to even more stringent restrictions than the “buffer” or 
“protected” areas.  Plant security forces must be screened, investigated, and trained 
according to NRC requirements.46  In the U.S. all nuclear power plants are privately 
owned. Therefore, private owners must also absorb the cost of training, screening, hiring, 
equipping and arming security personnel.47 
Even though the plants are federally regulated, the training of security personnel 
is of inconsistent quality.  For example, guards at the Shearon Hills nuclear power plant 
based in the Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina metropolitan region made numerous 
complaints that plant management was not advocating or enforcing proper security 
measures or reporting violations to the NRC.  It was not simply that plant management 
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was declining to implement additional security measures beyond the bare minimum 
requirements.  Rather, the guards’ complaints were based on multiple violations of 
minimum regulatory requirements resulting from plant management’s attempts to cut 
costs.  The guards at Shearon Harris are employed by a privately owned contractor, 
Securitas Security Services USA.  However, although the security officers work for 
Ameritas, the guards’ supervisors at Shearon Hills work directly for Progress Energy, 
Internet owns and operates the Shearon Hills plant.   
Two guards interviewed by the Raleigh Durham Independent refused to provide 
their full identities, out of fear of reprisals from Progress Energy and their supervisors.  
Progress Energy has a track-record of retaliating against employers who complain about 
security issues.  Progress terminated the employment of Richard Kester, “a former high-
ranking security official at Shearon Harris who was fired in 1999 after refusing to lie to 
the NRC about improper security officials.”48  One of the Ameritas guards told the 
Independent that he had repeatedly contacted the NRC, but, after NRC failed to respond, 
the guards decided to take their case to the media and other watch-dog groups.  The 
guards alleged that routine searches of vehicles entering plant premises were suspended 
in order to minimize delays in the plant’s operations and that security doors had broken 
locks and could be opened merely by pulling on the handles forcefully.  When guards 
brought the broken locks to the attention of plant management, they were instructed to 
not so forcefully pull on the doors, and the locks were not replaced.  One of the guards 
says the other guards are scared as “they get fired right and left.”49  In response to the 
above allegations, the Employment Discrimination Bureau of the North Carolina 
Department of Labor opened investigations into Shearon-Harris’ alleged unlawful 
retaliatory action, including firings of guards who complained about security breaches.    
A non-profit organization called The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) 
alleges further lapses in security at nuclear power plants.  In Tennessee, evidence of the 
failure of guards to properly inspect cargo entering the plant’s compound was revealed.  
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A shipment of M-4 assault rifles was delivered to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority had the responsibility of managing it and should have been 
sent to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant’s armory.  The boxes were not labeled correctly and 
passed through four search locations where the cargo should have been discovered.   The 
boxes were not opened, as they should have been, and subsequently were sent to a plant 
warehouse.  The point of concern is not that the M-4s were improperly placed, but that 
the cargo was not inspected after passing through multiple checkpoints.   
This incident highlights the vulnerabilities of the nation's nuclear power 
plants, said Peter Stockton, a spokesman for POGO.  "There are really 
terrible procedures allowing this to happen," he said in a telephone 
interview Wednesday.  Stockton said if disgruntled insiders knew about 
this vulnerability and were able to bring weapons and explosives into the 
nuclear facility, there may be irreparable damage.  ‘We're talking a whole 
lot worse than Three Mile Island," he said. "If an insider knows where the 
target sets are, in other words, the way to damage the reactor or to blow a 
hole in the spent fuel pool, it would be a hell of a lot worse than anything 
we've ever seen in this country before.50 
Frank von Hippel, who is ex assistant director for national security in the White House 
Office of Science and Technology, says the companies who own the nuclear power plants 
are unwilling to spend the money needed to maintain the proper protection levels.51  
The question that should be asked, “is how well trained the guards at nuclear 
power plants really are? Plant security guards routinely qualify on the firing range with 
assault-weapons such as the Israeli Uzi or the U.S.-made M-4.  The director of the Bay 
City Texas nuclear plant, known as the South Texas Project, says their guard force is well 
trained in preventing armed attackers from gaining access to the facility.  Mark Burnett, 
South Texas Project Vice President, said “We train for armed intruders.  Basically, it’s 
paramilitary fashion to stop these people from getting into the plant.”52  Burnett says the 
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training consists of simulated attacks with ex-special forces members as the attackers.  
The plant’s security force defends against and delays the attackers while local and federal 
law enforcement response teams come to their assistance.53   
 The NRC calls this training exercise force-on-force exercises and conducts and 
observes such exercises as part of its evaluation of a plant’s compliance with the DBT.  
These exercises are more than simple gun-play with blank ammunition; they entail 350 
hours of inspections in conjunction with the simulated assault on the plant.  For the 
attacking force to “win” the exercise, it must reach specific targets within the power plant 
compound.  These targets are facilities or components, whose sabotage or destruction 
would result in a release of radioactive material.   
 Local law enforcement would coordinate the emergency response to an actual 
attack. However, participation of law enforcement or federal agencies in the local area is 
not incorporated into the NRC’s official force on force exercises.54  In December 2009, 
DTE Energy, the managers of the Michigan Fermi plant in Newport, Michigan, along 
with local and federal officials, held a training exercise to repel armed attackers trying to 
gain access to the facility.  The training scenario not only employed responders from the 
plant’s personnel and security forces, but it also included local emergency departments, 
the FBI, the Michigan State Police, the local Sheriff’s department, and other local law 
enforcement agencies.  A detailed details and information on the conduct of the exercise 
and quality of the participants’ performance was not released, but DTE claimed the 
exercise was “an outstanding success.”55  However, Steve Stockton, an investigator with 
POGO, argues that these simulated exercises are conducted under conditions that are not 
sufficiently similar to those that would exist in the event of a real attack.  He asserts that 
the exercise scenarios generally only use a team of five hostile attackers, rather than 
twelve, Internet he believes would be more realistic.  Also, there are limitations on 
weaponry used by the attackers in force-on-force exercises, “they don’t allow the 
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‘terrorists’ to use automatic weapons or high-powered explosives.”56  The DBT does 
dictate restrictions on what the conditions under Internet force-on-force exercises are 
conducted.  However, in 2006, the NRC began allowing plants that successfully pass 
their first two force-on-force exercises to conduct subsequent simulations using more 
open parameters.57   
Planning for the force-on-force exercises based on the DBT requires several steps.  
The DBT was first implemented in the 1970s and revised in 2003.  Prior to the 2003 
revision, criteria were formulated to determine the characteristics of the attackers who 
would simulate the assault on a nuclear plant.  The first step entailed review of current 
intelligence reports to assign attack characteristics to the adversary force based on a given 
terrorist organization.  The next step involved determining whether the given terrorist 
group had ever operated in the United States or was only active overseas.  It was then 
ascertained whether the terrorist group needs to operate in a more or less secure 
environment.   “NRC considers that terrorists planning to attack a nuclear power plant in 
the United States would face greater operational security and logistical challenges than 
terrorists operating in countries where there is an internal insurgency.”58  The last two 
steps for assigning characteristics to the attacking force involve examining how often the 
terrorist group that is being used as a model has used the given attack characteristic, 
Internet targets that characteristic has been used against, and the purpose for attacking 
those targets.  For example, would a terrorist group use a certain weapon in an attack 
against a soft target or against a more secure, better-defended target?   
In 2003, the NRC reviewed this multi-step process and recommended revising the 
DBT to include suicide bombing among the potential modes of attack against nuclear 
plants.  However, after the NRC initiated the process of expanding the DBT’s list of 
potential weapons used by potential attackers and elicited comments from stakeholders, 
members of the nuclear industry objected to the addition of suicide bombs.  The industry 
also resisted the NRC’s recommendation that the DBT encompass the possibility of an 
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attack initiated or assisted by a plant insider, an employee who knowingly or 
unknowingly compromises security in some way, to the benefit of the attackers.  The 
NRC acceded to the industry’s request that inside threats be omitted from the DBT based 
on the rationale that personnel screening programs would eliminate the possibility of such 
an attack.  However, as demonstrated in the section on the cyber threat, it is possible for 
an employee or contractor to compromise a plant’s security measures without intending 
to do so. 
After the World Trade Center bombing, Senate Hearings were held to determine 
whether there was a threat to nuclear power reactors in light of the penetration of Three 
Mile Island’s security.  Phillip Clark, the chairman of General Public Utilities Nuclear 
Corporation, Internet owned the Three Mile Island facility, was called to testify before 
the Senate hearings.  Clark stated that “[t]he fence he went through is designed to detect 
intrusion, not stop it.  I keep hearing or seeing things in print that say security was 
breached.  I don’t think that is a correct characterization.”59  At the Senate hearings other 
groups testified, including non-government agencies: 
Eldon V. C. Greenberg, representing two watchdog groups, the Nuclear 
Control Institute, Internet is concerned with weapons proliferation, and the 
Committee to Bridge the Gap, a safety group, said that for years the 
commission [NRC] had assumed that truck bombs were not credible and 
that if they became credible, there would be warning. "In a span of less 
than three weeks, both those pillars have been demolished," he said. 60 
It is not the first time security has been breached at a nuclear plant nor the first time a 
vehicle entered a supposedly secure area. The picture below illustrates the route a station 
wagon was driven without detection.  It went past the initial security gate at the top right, 
and eventually into the Turbine Bldg where his vehicles topped, however, the intruder 
was never found or charged.  
                                                 
59 Scott Portzline, Nuclear Plant Terrorism” (New York) 5. 
60 Matthew Wald, “Nuclear Plants Said to Be Vulnerable to Bombings,” New York Times, 21 March 
1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/21/us/nuclear-plants-said-to-be-vulnerable-to-bombings.htm.    
 29
 
Figure 1.   The illustration was taken from “Another Nuclear Threat-Nuclear Plant 
Terrorism” p. 46. Author: Porzline, Scott D. Harrisburg, PA, 3/28/1994. The 
overhead photo comes from Google Map. “3 Mile Island” (Satellite View).  
At this time, nuclear power plants’ physical defense was a low priority.  During 
these same hearings, the then-NRC Chairman Ivan Selin stated that NRC did not have the 
responsibility to provide safety and security against terrorist attacks.  He stated that 
terrorism was the responsibility of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. “If 
somebody drove a bomb into the parking lot, blew it up, killed a hundred people at a 
power reactor, that’s not our problem” he said.61   At the time Selin made this statement, 
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regulations had not yet been drafted and enforced requiring plants to construct physical 
vehicle barriers as a defense against vehicle bombs.   
 Following the 9/11 attacks, further regulations were implemented with the 
specific purpose of preventing the theft of nuclear material from plant premises. The 
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response were established by the NRC in April 
2002 in order to fortify and strengthen the security of the country’s nuclear reactors in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  In addition, the NRC mandated that plants expand their overall 
security protocols to defend against potential attacks implemented through water vehicles 
and ground vehicles other than four-wheel drive automobiles and to account for the 
possibility of combined attacks involving both a vehicle bomb and another form of 
external assault, such as an intrusion by armed terrorists.62  The cost of security 
enhancements to American nuclear power plants since September 11, 2001, including 
additional physical security barriers, increased security forces, and improved detection 
equipment now exceeds $1.2 billion.63 
However, the final rule formulated by the NRC excluded attacks by aircraft; thus, 
power companies that operate private nuclear plants are not required to implement 
security measures that specifically address the possibility of an attack in Internet a 
passenger jet is used as the primary weapon of assault.64 This omission caused quite a stir 
in both the scientific and political communities.  A group of scientists who called 
themselves the Union of Concerned Scientists had submitted a proposal, ultimately 
rejected by the NRC, Internet called for the construction of “beamhenge” barriers, 
barriers made of steel beams and cables that would surround nuclear plants and prevent 
intrusion of aircraft.  In rejecting the proposal, the NRC countered that the threat of attack 
by large aircraft was more adequately and appropriately addressed by the military and 
other government agencies and organizations, such as Department of Homeland Security, 
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the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.65  The NRC 
insisted that it was not exempting plants from defending themselves from terrorist 
attacks.  It instead was recognizing the reality that defense against certain terrorist threats, 
such as hijacked airliners used as kamikaze weapons cannot be defended against by 
private security forces.66 The GAO-06-388, dated March 2006, went on to address 
different types of attacks. Arguing that protocols were already in place to address attacks 
by air and that private companies should not be expected to defend themselves against 
incursions that were more properly construed like national security threats, the NRC 
chose to concentrate on physical attacks perpetrated by ground and water vehicles.   
The NRC requires each licensed nuclear power plant to carry out security tests 
and measures after a period of three years in order to strengthen security against any 
forthcoming terrorist attacks or threats posed in scenarios outlined the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT).  The DBT requires plants to prepare for defense against “an attack by 
several well-trained and dedicated individuals armed with hand-carried weapons and 
equipment and assisted by a knowledgeable insider who participates in a passive or active 
role.”67 The NRC tests plant readiness to counter the attacks hypothesized in the DBT 
through simulated exercises as documented by GAO-06-388, March 2006, 11.  In these 
“force-on-force” attack exercises administered by the NRC, attacks by outside 
adversaries attempting to infiltrate and damage the plant’s vital area are simulated.  A 
number of simulations, each presenting a different attack scenario are conducted over 
several days under NRC supervision and observation.68  Before a company obtains a 
license for building and setup of a nuclear power plant, it must develop a security plan 
specifically designed to safeguard towards the threats outlined in the DBT and obtain the 
NRC’s approval of the plan.69   
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As of November 2005, the NRC had carried out force-on-force inspections at only 
20 of 65 sites and projected that inspections of all sites would not be completed until 
2007.  In addition, some sites have consistently failed to meet the requirements set forth 
by the DBT and NRC regulations.70 
However, the United States General Accountability Office (GAO), while 
recognizing that the NRC has enhanced security regulations for nuclear plants, has also 
been critical of the NRC and urged it to do more.  For instance, the GAO raised concern 
in testimony before Congress that almost 50 percent of the nuclear plants in the United 
States were all using the security company Wackenhut.  The GAO raised the possibility 
of conflict of interest and observed that Wackenhut organization was charged of cheating 
on brutal exercises, Internet were observed and controlled by the Department of Energy. 
Moreover, critics have continued to criticize the NRC’s failure to address nuclear plants’ 
vulnerability from attack by aircraft.  At the time when nuclear power plants were 
constructed in the United States, they were built to withstand hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and other natural disasters, but no additional design in the plant accounts for a deliberate 
airliner crash such as those perpetrated on 9/11.  Some experts contend that an aircraft 
deliberately crashed into a nuclear plant containment shell could trigger a reactor 
meltdown and widespread exposure to radiation among the public.71  However, the NRC 
and the nuclear industry itself contend that nuclear plants would be difficult attack targets 
for large aircraft and that, even if a deliberately crashed airliner penetrated the 
containment shell, it is unlikely that it would reach the actual reactor vessel.  They also 
argue that such an attack could not achieve a sustained, super-hot fire, such as the one 
that led to the demise of the Twin Towers, unless the plane’s body, including the wings 
that carry its fuel completely penetrated through the containment shell.72 
 Nils Diaz, former NRC Chairman, has stated on record that the possibility of an 
aircraft crash harming the reactor core, resulting in the release of radiation at levels that 
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negatively influence public health and safety, is exceedingly low.  However, no matter 
how unlikely it is that such an attack would be successful, political pressure has had some 
effect in directing NRC and industry policy.  On a forward-looking basis, newly 
constructed nuclear plants will be required to design and construct containment shells 
with the aim of protecting the reactor core from the impact of a large commercial aircraft, 
Internet will drive up construction costs. 
 Concerns about physical attacks on nuclear power plants should extend beyond 
airborne attacks.  Because there is no central depository for nuclear waste in the United 
States, all spent fuel is stored on a plant’s physical site.  One of the most vulnerable and 
least protected points at nuclear power plants is the storage area for spent fuel, Internet is 
generally kept in cooling pools or, less frequently, in dry casks.  For example, in April 
2005, the National Academy of Sciences stated that “successful terrorist attacks on spent 
fuel pools, though difficult, are possible, and that “if an attack leads to a propagating 
zirconium-cladding fire, it could result in the release of large amounts of radioactive 
material.”73  The study recommended that, when stored in pools on plant premises, the 
most recently spent, and thus hottest, of used fuel rods are intermingled with cooler spent 
rods in order to decrease the possibility of fire and that sprinkler systems are set up in 
case pool water is lost.74   
 In his discussion of nuclear terrorism, David Bodansky points out that it is “not 
clear how high a place nuclear terrorism occupies in planning by terrorist groups.”75  
Targets exist that are both easier to attack and more symbolic than nuclear plants.  Such 
targets include the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, and high-value political 
targets, such as the Capitol Building and the White House.  In addition, attacks on softer 
targets, such as movie theaters, sports stadiums, and shopping malls promise terrorists an 
opportunity to inflict mass casualties on a greater scale.  This is in comparison to the 
resources and logistical hurdles a terrorist group would have to overcome to successfully 
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attack a nuclear power plant.76  If terrorists intend to disrupt the American economy or its 
infrastructure, mass transit systems, tunnels, and bridges pose more desirable targets.  
Among other options available to them, terrorists could disrupt energy transmission by 
attacking electrical transmission lines, gas and oil pipelines, or oil tankers.  The tainting 
of food and water supplies and the use of weapons of mass destruction, if they are 
available, would result in more immediate casualties across a wide swath of the United 
States than an attack on a single nuclear plant.77 
 Nuclear plants have little symbolic value and terrorist attacks on nuclear plants 
are not likely to result in high death toll of some other types of attacks because of the 
physical security measures and evacuation plans in use at American power plants. As 
Bodansky points out in his book, Nuclear Energy, Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 
nuclear plants offer two potential targets for terrorists: the physical reactors and the used 
fuel, Internet stored on plant grounds, either in pools of water or dry casks.  He also notes 
that a physical attack on a nuclear power plants could take one of two forms: an attack by 
armed terrorist intruders or a deliberate aircraft collapse directly into a nuclear power 
plant. 
 Bodansky deems the airliner crash scenario that has so captured the public and 
political imagination to be the least likely path to a victorious radical assault on a nuclear 
plant.  He points out those American nuclear plants are subject to regulations that require 
the construction of a containment shell to enclose the plant.  These containment shells are 
constructed with the plan of it surviving the impact of a small plane crash.  Although 
Bodansky concedes that these containment structures might not withstand the impact of a 
large passenger plane, he points out that nuclear power plants make particularly 
challenging targets.  Because a nuclear power plant is relatively small—when compared 
to large sized targets such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it is constructed 
at low level ground, this would be cumbersome for yet a skilled pilot to achieve the 
desired impact.  Moreover, as Bodansky notes, to produce the intended catastrophic 
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effect, the impact would have to disable the plant’s cooling system and not only breach 
the containment shell but reach the reactor vessel inside.78 
 As for attacks by armed intruders, Bodansky points out in the same book that 
nuclear plants are heavily guarded by private security forces and that existing security 
protocols would result in the immediate shut-down of the plant at the first indication of 
an attack “with no option for restarting.”   According to Bodansky, the accomplishment 
of such an assault  
…would depend on the ability of the intruders to overcome the guards and 
disable the normal and emergency cooling systems in such a manner that 
they could not be restored in time to avert an eventual reactor meltdown.  
The worst case scenario is a serious one, but evacuation of the surrounding 
population could mitigate the harm and the chances of success are 
dubious. 
—Bodasnky, Nuclear Energy, Principles, Practices, and Prospects 
 Bodansky does admit that the spent fuel stored at nuclear plants also poses a risk 
in the event of an armed attack.  He points out, however, that “the heat output of the spent 
fuel is low relative to the heat output of fuel in a reactor that has just been shut down” in 
Nuclear Energy, Principles, Practices and Prospects. He concludes that even if a cooling 
pool in Internet spent fuel rods are stored were breached by armed terrorists, they would 
face a serious challenge in creating a blast that will result in a dangerous dispersion of the 
bits contained in the rods.  On the other hand, Bodansky does concede and describes in 
his book that a dangerous condition could arise if a cooling pool was breached and the 
fuel rods inside were allowed to heat to dangerous levels.  In such an event, no explosion 
would be necessary to release radiation into the atmosphere because, due to limited air 
circulation, the densely packed fuel rods could begin to melt.  While Bodansky does not 
suggest that nuclear plants are impervious to attack or that an attack on a plant poses 
absolutely no danger, he argues that, because of the security measures in place and the  
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difficulty of attacking a nuclear plant, such attacks are likely to fail and that competent 
and well-organized terrorists will turn to the myriad “softer rich targets” that exist 
elsewhere on U.S. territory.79 
2.  The Possibility of Cyber-Terrorism Against a Nuclear Power Plant 
In the popular consciousness, an attack against a nuclear power plant could 
involve a deliberate plane crash into a facility, a bomb, or some form of physical 
sabotage to the reactor itself.  However, in his compelling article “The Current ‘Nuclear 
Renaissance’ in the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls,” 
Roland M. Frye points out that terrorist attacks on nuclear plants could very well take the 
form of cyber sabotage. Frye’s concern is a rational and well-supported one.  Although 
there has been no known, deliberate cyber attack on an American nuclear power plant, 
Frye’s article highlights some recent incidents that suggest the damage cyber terrorism 
could cause.  In one particularly alarming instance in August 2006, the Browns Ferry 
Unit 3 nuclear power plant in Alabama suffered a partial shut-down of two pumps after 
its computerized control system was overwhelmed by a broadcast storm. Systems failures 
at nuclear power plants could have devastating consequences: In January 2003, a partial 
failure of the computer system at the Oak Harbor, Ohio Davis-Beese nuclear power plant 
resulted in the five-hour shut-down of the plant’s safety monitoring system, as well as the 
shut-down of the plant’s processing computer, Internet remained off-line for six hours.80 
 Moreover, in a simulated cyber attack orchestrated by the Department of Energy, 
a nuclear generator was induced to self-destruct. Computer security experts retained by 
private power companies to test the safety measures in place at their nuclear reactors have 
found it disturbingly easy to hack into company computers, sometimes managing to 
infiltrate informational and operational systems in less than twenty-four hours.  In 
addition, terrorists with hacking and computer expertise could use these skills to gather 
information or facilitate other types of attacks; in 2007, it was discovered that hackers 
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had compromised databases containing personal identifying information of visitors to 
three national research labs that work with nuclear material and nuclear power: the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory.81  
 Although U.S. nuclear power plants have been built to endure natural calamities, 
such as earthquakes, cyclones, and tornados, there has been little attention paid to new 
vulnerabilities that have come with the dawn of the digital age.  As Joe Weiss notes in 
“Cyber Security in the Control Room,” many, if not most, of the nuclear power plants 
currently in operation in the United States are still functioning based on analog 
technology, because they were built long before the advent of the Internet and the 
advanced computer applications of today.82 However, any new plants constructed in the 
United States will be built using state-of-the-art digital computerization, and existing 
plants are being slowly but gradually updated with the introduction of digital technology, 
Internet enables superior operational capability but also creates vulnerabilities to cyber 
attacks.83 Many power companies believe that they have protected themselves against 
cyber attacks through encryption, firewalls, or the segregation of plant operational 
systems.  However, both Frye and Weiss point out that the routine linking of power 
companies’ corporate computer systems with the dedicated computer systems used to 
control, maintain, and operate nuclear plants and reactors results in definite and 
dangerous security weaknesses.  Because certain external computer systems will typically 
be less secure than the plant’s operational systems, especially given the use of e-mail and 
the World Wide Web, infiltrating corporate computer systems could enable hackers to 
more easily penetrate plant systems. 84   
Several companies are thinking breaking up their multiple networks 
(including control system networks) into a single network to minimize 
cost and maximize widespread proficiency. Though, this plan can have a  
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number of latent cyber implications. But, following these plans, the result 
would be the less secured systems would be attached with more secure 
systems.85 
Moreover, intra-company divisions between informational technology (IT) and plant 
operations groups may create conflicts or result in members of both groups acting at cross 
purposes due to lack of communication or unawareness of each other’s security needs 
and protocols. 86  As Weiss explains, “The issue Internet resides is that the technique is 
totally different from IT control systems. This resulted in a clash between operations and 
IT departments. Surely, due to this we have to compromise on security guidelines. In 
order to streamline all these factors the coordination between and IT and operations is 
vital.”  
 Weiss underscores a problem that is perhaps more difficult to resolve and more 
dangerous in its ramifications.  The operators of plant computer systems themselves do 
not always have a complete and thorough grasp of the intricacies of plant control and 
operational systems. Even when they do, they rarely, if ever, understand supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) security, the measures required to properly secure 
these systems.87   
Some are familiar with these Internet security measures and some who are 
acquainted with the nuclear plant securities must know these cyber ones. These types of 
securities normally host the people who are shifted from IT securities. Surely, the people 
who are required should be well versed with additional feature of nuclear licensing 
experience along with these securities. 88  
Cyber security in nuclear plants is truly and thoroughly understood by only a 
handful of specialists.  Cyber security in general is focused largely on the protection of  
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information.  The science of protecting systems responsible for the actual processes and 
operations of nuclear plants has not been studied or developed as well as standard IT 
technology. 89 
 Weiss indentifies even most computer security experts have only a limited 
knowledge of nuclear plant controls systems and related security technologies and 
protocols.  Moreover, there is little incentive for this knowledge to be developed and 
disseminated.  Power companies, Internet are in direct business competition with one 
another, rarely share information on security measures with their peers and often bind 
their employees with agreements that forbid the sharing of such knowledge.90 
D. SUMMARY  
Whether the potential threat is construed as physical or cyber in nature, nuclear 
plants do bear some vulnerabilities and these vulnerabilities spring from the same 
sources.  The nuclear industry currently has no incentive to invest heavily in matters of 
security, whether it is cyber security or physical plant security. 91  Implementing security 
measures, particularly new and innovative security measures, can be costly.  Businesses, 
including the power companies that run nuclear power plants, worry that investing too 
deeply in costly security measures will put them at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to their peers in the energy market.92  Moreover, as Bodansky points out, the 
NRC has relied too much on the nuclear industry’s point of view when constructing 
regulations and requirements, and likely even the parameters of the DBT.93 
 According to many experts on nuclear power plant security, security at nuclear 
power plants primarily “concerns the threat of radiological sabotage, a deliberate act 
against a plant that could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety through 
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exposure to radiation.”94  However, given the difficulties of perpetrating an airborne 
attack against a nuclear plant, the deliberate aircraft crash method of assaulting a plant 
seems unlikely.  Moreover, even though the physical defenses of America’s nuclear 
plants could no doubt be improved, the chances of a more conventional physical attack 
succeeding or of causing a widespread threat to public health and safety are minimal 
when compared to the potential catastrophic consequences that would ensue as a result of 
terrorist attacks on softer and richer targets.   
Cyber terrorism is clearly a more pressing concern when considering nuclear 
power plant security.  Nuclear power plants have demonstrable cyber vulnerabilities.  
However, political discourse on nuclear plant security still centers on physical security 
rather than cyber security, and NRC regulations and “force-on-force” exercises focus 
primarily, even exclusively, on physical attacks, even though a cyber attack presents a 
more likely scenario. Moreover, the most frequently discussed scenarios of terrorist 
attacks on nuclear power plants involve Islamic fundamentalist or other international 
terrorist groups.  Minute notice has been thrown to the chances of domestic attacks, and 
even less to domestic cyber-terrorism.  In subsequent chapters, this thesis will attempt to 
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IV. THREATS TO NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 
A. DOMESTIC THREATS TO NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION 
This chapter will explain the history of the U.S. citizens in their initial acceptance, 
then rejection of nuclear power development.  Examples will be given of groups who 
have been active in the U.S., protesting development and employment of nuclear power 
for energy.  Some of these protest groups still exist today and have found some effective 
means of slowing development and expansion of nuclear power.  These incidents will be 
highlighted.   In closing, the hypothetical threat of international threats, those external to 
the U.S., further research needs to be done in this area, since it is hard to validate the 
actual threat as viable.     
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was believed that the United States and the world were 
entering an age of nuclear power.  By the mid-1980s, new construction of nuclear plants 
had halted, and it was widely believed that the prospects of nuclear power as the primary 
American energy source were dead.  The rapid fall in the nuclear industry’s fortunes is 
traditionally attributed to incidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, Internet 
fueled rising public fears of nuclear power and spurred organized political protests and 
law suits against new plant construction. 
1.   Environmentalists’ Role   
However, many experts have concluded that environmentalists played little to no 
real role in nuclear power’s fall from favor in the United States.95  Some even go so far as 
to call environmentalists of the 1970s and 1980s as “uniformly ineffectual,” noting that 
“government policies at both the federal and state levels continued to favor nuclear 
power” even as they staged their protests.96  The same school of thought disputes the 
                                                 




conventional wisdom that the Three Mile Island accident brought about the end of the 
nuclear industry, given that “a wave of cancellations of new nuclear plant orders was 
already underway.”97  From this perspective, the environmentalists did not halt the 
further development or employment of nuclear power by turning public opinion against 
nuclear plants; rather, the fall of the nuclear industry is attributed to economic factors.  
For instance, according to Craig A. Severance, “Utility executives and Wall Street 
financiers were the ones who stopped nuclear power’s expansion in the 1970s. As more 
evidence of the business risks and the costs associated with nuclear power became clear 
through utilities’ own experiences, utility boards across the country and the financial 
houses that fund them, stopped considering nuclear power a serious future option.98 
Orders for new plants that had already been advanced were quietly withdrawn.  The 
nuclear industry simply failed to compete against other available options, whose risks and 
costs were significantly lower.” 
Severance believes, while political activists are often credited with the demise of 
the original “nuclear renaissance” of the 1950s and 1960s, it is impossible to deny the 
role played by economic factors, including the large upfront costs associated with plant 
construction and the financial losses incurred through plant shutdowns and inefficiencies. 
 Nonetheless, other commentators insist that, even if public and political 
opposition may not be solely responsible for curbing the expansion of nuclear power, it 
can still serve to slow plant construction, interfere with plant operation, and add to the 
costs incurred by the nuclear industry in opening and maintaining nuclear power plants.  
As Severance points out even those who believe that the primary threats to future plant 
construction are financial and economic, not political, recognize that organized political 
and public protest against plant construction can raise associated costs, particularly in the 
form of legal fees required to defend against lawsuits and requests for injunctions.99  He 
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even states as the next “Nuclear Renaissance” begins to dawn in America, many fear that 
associated litigation could cause delays in plant construction and thus increase 
exponentially the costs incurred by plant owners and operators.  For instance, Moody’s 
Investor Services asserted that “[it] believe[s] the first COL filing will be litigated, 
Internet could create lengthy delays for the rest of the sector.”100 
2.  The American Public’s Role 
 However, the attitude of the public towards nuclear power has evolved over the 
past twenty years or so. Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter discuss in Elite Ideology 
and Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy. They asserted that while nuclear power 
was once seen as a looming threat to environmental integrity, it is now viewed by many 
as a form of clean energy that could help halt the insidious effects of global warming.  
Many observers have linked the fate of nuclear power to popular opinion of nuclear 
plants and their safety with respect to the community and the natural environment.  The 
American public shifted from widespread, unhindered acceptance of nuclear power in the 
years following World War II to a conviction that “wide-ranging laws protecting . . . 
against risks [of] environmental degradation [posed by nuclear power] [we]re absolutely 
necessary,” in the 1970s and 1980s.101  They also illustrate that some right-leaning 
political thinkers believe that, at least when it comes to nuclear power, “leftist” public 
interest groups, in concert with the “liberal” media, wield more power than either the 
private business sector, the mainstream scientific community, or the federal government 
in determining the direction of the nation’s technological development. They also talk 
about those who emphasize the role of public opinion in steering such technological 
decisions concede that “cost overruns and the abandonment of many partially completed 
nuclear facilities in United States have probably played a role in the development of 
negative attitudes” toward nuclear power.  However, they point out that “for the average 
person, fears about the safety [of nuclear plants] are far more important.”  From this point 
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of view, events such as the Three Mile Island incident and the Chernobyl meltdown had a 
more detrimental effect on nuclear plant construction and operation than did ballooning 
construction costs and other unforeseen cost overruns.102 
 For instance, in 1987, Rothman and Lichter concluded that “nuclear development 
[was] not, at [that] time, a viable energy option in the United States” because, even 
though the scientific community believe that nuclear power posed little threat to the 
environment, “[t]he view that nuclear plants are unsafe [was] shared by a significant 
number of citizens in positions of social influence or responsibility.”103  Rothman and 
Lichter credit organized antinuclear groups with a great deal of power and influence in 
the national political debate over nuclear power that raged in the latter part of the 
twentieth-century. 
 However, other analysts dispute the notion that the antinuclear movement was 
sufficiently organized and powerful to have a deep effect on the prospects of nuclear 
power.  Author Gary L. Downey in “Ideology and the Clamshell Organizational 
Dilemmas in the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement, Social Problems” uses the example of 
the Clamshell Alliance, Internet emerged in New England in the 1970s.  He illustrates 
how it spawned imitators across the United States, Internet shows the organizational and 
philosophical weaknesses that plagued most anti-nuclear protest groups and ultimately 
undermined their effectiveness.  Downey explains that the Clamshell Alliance based itself 
on a philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience, as exemplified by their peaceful 
occupation of a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire and their subsequent 
incarceration in National Guard armories, where they continued their protest by refusing 
bail, an attitude that attracted much attention from the media and the public.  For a time, 
the Clamshell Alliance became the model for effective political protest against the 
construction of nuclear power plants.  Soon, similar organizations sprung up all over the 
United States, wherever new plant construction was planned or contemplated.104  
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However, Downey reveals that the Clamshell Alliance, as well as its imitator 
organizations, was vulnerable to internal strife over long-term goals and the appropriate 
strategies for meeting them.  Part of the difficulties faced by groups that embraced direct 
action through peaceful protest lay in their organizational design; most such 
organizations made decisions by consensus, Internet worked when group members were 
more or less in agreement but Internet rendered concrete action almost impossible when 
opinions began to diverge.105 
 As Downey has noted that especially as the membership rolls of the Clamshell 
Alliance and other groups began to escalate, the consensus method of decision-making 
was no longer practical.  As the consensus process was gradually abandoned, group 
members became disillusioned and angry, resulting in internal organizational conflict.  
These groups, Internet originally appeared to be models of efficiency, began to splinter 
into opposing factions.106  The resulting dissolution of these protest groups greatly 
diminished their ability to disrupt plant construction and performance and, more 
important, their potential to influence government and public opinion according to 
Downey. He says, in addition, state and local governments further undermined the 
influence of such groups, ironically, by taking steps to accommodate their protests and 
displays of civil disobedience.  Having learned of a planned Clamshell Alliance protest or 
peaceful occupation, state and local governments would issue permits for rallies and 
officially sanctioned political protests. He concludes that this governmental cooperation 
with the group’s political protest undermined its success by robbing it of its aura of 
disobedience and political opposition.  It also opened a rift within the group over whether 
the Alliance should participate in the rally. 
B. INTERNATIONAL THREATS 
Americans have long worried about nuclear power plants as a focus of 
international terrorism, a fear that has only intensified in the years following the World 
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Trade Center and Pentagon 9/11 attacks.  Experts and commentators differ on the risk of 
an international radical assault on the nuclear power plant and the seriousness of the 
consequences if one should occur.  
Danger of catastrophic radiation release from a nuclear power plant is posed by 
the potential loss of reactor core coolant and subsequent “melt down.”107   However, 
NRC studies have confirmed that the possibility of eradicating the reactor centre and 
discharging radiation in levels significant enough to affect public health is poor.108 
1.  Plant Structure 
In David Bodansky’s Nuclear Energy, Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 
today’s nuclear power plants, built in a pre-9/11 era, were built to withstand natural 
disasters such as hurricanes but not the strength of a collision with an airliner.  
Nonetheless, it has been asserted, based on research performed at the Sandia National 
Laboratory, that the likelihood of an airplane, even a large passenger jet, penetrating the 
reinforced steel hull of a nuclear reactor is very unlikely.109  Moreover, a nuclear power 
plant, because of its low physical profile, would present a daunting challenge for a 
terrorist pilot attempting to strike it.  In order to make the sustained fire that would cause 
significant radiation release, a plane, including its fuel-bearing wings, would have to 
penetrate the containment shield completely.  The possibility that an airliner, flying a 
relatively small, low-lying target, could accomplish this is extremely small.110 
 However, the others point out that a nuclear power plant is vulnerable to attack 
not only at the reactor site but the site of its spent fuel storage as described by Frank N. 
von Hippel, Revisiting Nuclear Safety, here he explains that spent fuel rods are typically 
stored in pools of water to cool in an area protected by a 5-foot thick concrete wall.  The 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has concluded that a large aircraft could 
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potentially penetrate this protective wall, possibly damaging the pressurized water reactor 
and resulting in the rapid drainage of the pools. In such a scenario, the spent fuel rods 
could heat up to the point of fire leading to a large fission product release.  The NRC 
estimated a fire of such magnitude would result in the release of about 10 times as much 
radioactive materials as that of the 1986 incident at Chernobyl.111  The National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), found a small, but significant, possibility that if one were to 
attack a spent fuel cooling pool, dependent on the attack results, it could affect the rods’ 
zirconium cladding catching fire.  NAS recommended the installation of water-spray 
systems in spent fuel areas to replace lost pool water and the interspersing cooler rods 
with hotter, more recently used rods to lessen the likelihood of a dangerous zirconium 
fire.112 
 Others have pointed out that, while a direct attack on a nuclear core reactor is 
unlikely to meet with success, plants are vulnerable to operational failures, such as station 
blackout events that could result in damage to a plant’s nuclear core within a matter of 
hours.113  Thus, while a successful airborne assault on a nuclear plant seems unlikely, an 
armed terrorist attack on a plant could have potentially disastrous consequences.  In mock 
attack exercises staged at American nuclear plants by DHS, armed terrorists were able; 
one-half of the simulations, to breach the plant’s containment shell and destroy enough 
equipment to lead to a core meltdown.114  While nuclear plants are guarded by trained 
security forces, some argue that they are insufficient to meet the threats and expertise that 
would probably be demonstrated by an armed terrorist attack squad.115 
2.  Plant IT Systems 
 The concern about physical attacks on nuclear plants threatens to overshadow 
attention merited by a more likely, and potentially more dangerous, form of assault—a 
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cyber-attack on a nuclear plant.  The GAO has noted the “potentially devastating impact” 
or a cyber-attack on the nation’s computer systems to the functioning of crucial networks 
and concluded those cyber security vulnerabilities and its defenses needs to be better 
addressed by DHS.116  The GAO’s recommendations include conducting cyber-attack 
exercises and improvement of control systems at critical infrastructure sites.117  While 
none of these recommendations were focused specifically towards nuclear power plants, 
it makes sense for both DHS and the nuclear industry to consider these recommendations 
seriously when considering issues of plant security.  In particular, DHS’s design basis 
threat and the simulated exercises that it conducts to assess plant readiness to handle a 
terrorist attack, should be amended to include a cyber-security and cyber-attack 
component.  
C.  SUMMARY 
This chapter explained the domestic and international threats to nuclear power 
plants. It presented the environmentalists and American public’s role in the early 
development of the nuclear power industry. Then it discussed the plant physical structure 
in its role of protection against a physical threat and then keyed in on the weakness of the 
plant IT systems. These measures have a significant monetary cost that will be looked at 
in the next chapter. 
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V. COSTS TO THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY OF SAFEGUARDING 
PLANTS AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS 
 This chapter will examine the relative costs of building new nuclear power plants, 
in relation to non-nuclear energy costs.  The evidence will be in an the United States’ 
open economy and the desires of nuclear power plant owners to extend their operating 
licenses can find funding to build the new plants. Nuclear power plants’ cost 
effectiveness is then examined, along with the costs of fossil fuels in comparison.   
A.  FUNDING 
There is much debate over exactly how much nuclear-generated electricity, 
nuclear plant operation, and new nuclear construction in the United States will cost in the 
much-heralded and anticipated “Nuclear Renaissance.”  Utility companies keen to invest 
in nuclear power argue that nuclear electricity is the least expensive option for the 
production and distribution of energy to American consumers and businesses.  Supporters 
of nuclear energy claim that nuclear-generated electricity will be cheaper.  This is due to 
lower fuel costs and the added benefit of clean energy and reduced carbon-dioxide 
emissions.118  Skeptics, however, argue that these estimates and claims are exaggerated, 
if not entirely unreasonable.  They point to the nuclear industry’s history of construction 
delays and cost overruns and its tradition of passing its unexpected expenses on to the 
American public in the form of high electricity rates.  One factor that is not discussed in 
regular discussions of the costs of nuclear energy is the role of plant security measures.  
Although many argue that nuclear plants are attractive targets to international and 
domestic terrorists, none of the leading economic studies use the additional costs of 
protecting against that threat into account when calculating the construction costs of new 
nuclear plants or the pre-tax levelized cost of nuclear-generated electricity (LCOE). 
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 Nuclear power plants are notoriously expensive to construct and operate. 119  This 
reputation is based primarily on cost overruns on nuclear power plant projects in the 
1960s and 1970s, Internet, always took longer and cost more to build than expected.120  
In addition, this first generation of nuclear power plant was often less than reliable in its 
functioning; shut-downs and malfunctions meant plant downtime and facility repairs and, 
ultimately, an intense drain on the financial resources of both nuclear power companies 
and their investors.121  In McLellan’s, The Economics of Nuclear Power, cost overruns 
and construction delays continued into the 1980s, a period of high interest rates, Internet 
further complicated the prospect for nuclear power companies and nuclear plant 
construction projects. He discusses the efficiency and reliability rates of early nuclear 
power plants were much lower than hoped and promised.  In 1975, the average nuclear 
plant operating in the United States was working at only 55.9 percent capacity.  
Performance had barely improved a decade later in 1985, when the amount hovered at 
58.0 percent capacity.  He also believes that scares such as the 1979 Three-Mile Island 
accident spurred the passage of additional safety regulations, many of Internet were 
expensive to implement.   
B.  LEGAL ISSUES 
He clearly outlines that this concern over safety also turned many members of the 
American citizenry, Internet had been largely supportive of nuclear power in the 1950s, 
against the construction of new nuclear plants. He further explains that announcements of 
new plant construction projects were met with neighborhood protests and legal fights.  
The time, effort, and legal resources necessary to thwart such public and ground-level 
political opposition also drained the coffers of the nuclear industry.  The resulting delays 
extended the expected operation start date of nuclear plant construction projects.  It 
further meant that early investments in such projects took years longer than expected to 
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start paying off.  The additional, unpredicted expenses suffered by the nuclear energy 
industry were often passed on to the consumer in the form of higher electricity rates.  
Decades after the resolutions of these struggles, the notion of nuclear plants as bottomless 
money pits lingers in the public consciousness, especially among those in the all-
important business community, the source of potential investors in nuclear power. 
C.  COST EFFECTIVENESS 
 McLellan also states, however, proponents of nuclear power argue that modern 
plants are proving more cost-effective in recent years, even to the point of attracting 
significant private sector investment.  This is attributed mainly to improved performance 
and effectiveness of current nuclear plants.  There has been a financial turnaround in the 
nuclear energy industry founded on the increased efficiency of nuclear reactors.  By 
2004, nuclear power plant capacity had increased to over 90 percent.  Between 1994 and 
2004, the combined electricity production of U.S. nuclear plants increased from 640 
billion to 789 billion kilowatt hours. He gave details on astoundingly, this increase 
occurred despite an overall decrease in the number of nuclear power plants in operation, 
in the United States. Meserve and Moniz claim that the average production cost for 
nuclear-generated electricity is somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.71 cents per 
kilowatt-hour, a figure that supposedly takes into account all costs except for plant 
amortization and makes nuclear power possibly the cheapest form of electric power 
available in the United States, cheaper even than coal. They also point out that the cost of 
nuclear energy remains fairly stable and is not subject to the fluctuations that often roil 
the natural gas market.122 
Meserve and Moniz point to the recent consolidation in the nuclear industry as 
evidence of the attractiveness of nuclear power to both providers and consumers. Utility 
companies, betting that nuclear energy is the power of the future as concerns over foreign 
oil and carbon emissions grown, began buying up existing nuclear plants and investing in 
                                                 
122 Meserve and Moniz, The Changing Climate for Nuclear Power, 57–72. 
 52
nuclear research and development in the mid 1990s.123  As utility companies purchase 
older nuclear plants in anticipation of a nuclear renaissance, it is anticipated that, before 
the end of the next decade, all 104 of the nation’s currently existing nuclear plants in a 
few years time will be held in the hands of a select group of about ten power 
companies.124  Nuclear energy proponents point to this trend towards consolidation as 
evidence that the utility industry has begun to realize that nuclear power will, in the long 
run, be better for its bottom line.  They argue that this is further evidenced by the flood of 
20-year license renewals for existing nuclear plants.125  As of October 2006, 44 operators 
of 44 nuclear power plants had applied for and received operating license renewals, 10 
other renewal applications were pending and 17 additional requests were predicted to be 
presented by the end of 2010.126 Current reactors whose licenses were expired had been 
certified in Internet 10 were under evaluation, and 17 more requests were predicted to be 
received, by 2010. 
D.  INDUSTRY BOOM 
In addition, applications to build new power plants are soaring.127  The nuclear 
industry seems to believe that it can learn from the mistakes and missteps of the past.  It 
also believes it can take advantage of new technological advancements and shorter 
licensing processes to build plants more quickly for less money.  While plants used to 
take as long as fifteen years to build, the projected construction period is now between  
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three and five years.128  In addition, the NRC licensing process for nuclear power plants 
has been streamlined so as to address the delay in plant construction that typically 
resulted from the regulatory process.129 
Nuclear power plants are still expensive to build, especially when compared to 
natural-gas-powered plants.  The upfront capital costs of nuclear plant construction are 
indeed daunting, especially to investors.  Again, McLellan shows, nuclear energy 
proponents argue that nuclear power plants have become increasingly cheaper to operate.  
Despite the high up-front investment required to build a nuclear plant and bring it online, 
it is far less expensive to operate than a plant powered by gas. This is due primarily to the 
fact that fuel costs account for up to 65 percent of the cost of generating electricity from a 
natural-gas plant, while fuel costs account for only 15 percent of the costs of nuclear-
generated electricity.130   
Meserve and Moniz, The Changing Climate for Nuclear Power, point to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its regulatory role as an indirect gatekeeper on 
costs. They note that, while NRC used to concern itself only with plant design and 
construction, it has turned its attention more and more toward operations and 
maintenance as concerns about health, accidents, and terrorist attacks have mounted. 
According to Meserve and Moniz, increased regulation will be effective at keeping prices 
down because safer, well regulated plants are more efficient, more reliable, and less 
prone to accidents, break-downs, and other expense-generating incidents.131  Moreover, 
“great strides have been made in methods of quantifying the risk associated with reactor 
accidents.  This technique, called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), is a systematic 
evaluation of the plant to determine potential accident consequences and evaluate their 
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frequencies by looking at the probabilities of failure of systems and components” and 
was developed by the NRC in concert with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).132 
 Ultimately, according to Meserve and Moniz, The Changing Climate for Nuclear 
Power, the appeal of transitioning to nuclear power for utility companies will depend 
largely upon the perceived cost-efficiency of constructing nuclear plants and using 
nuclear energy in comparison to the costs of building utility plants that use natural gas 
and the cost of natural gas. The attractiveness of the American consumer will depend 
largely on the notion of cost-savings, with concerns over global warming playing a 
tangential role. However, investors shun uncertainty and want to see immediate results.  
Thus, in a deregulated energy market such as  in the United States, even given the 
improvements in nuclear plant construction and operation realized in recent years, 
investors will probably prefer projects that require less upfront money and promise to 
deliver on investment more rapidly than nuclear power plants.133  In addition, the 
projected costs savings of advanced nuclear power plants are just that—projections.  
Construction time estimates and predictions of cost-efficiency may be the result of over-
optimism.  A number of factors, both foreseen and unforeseen, could eventually drive the 
price tag on both nuclear plant construction and nuclear energy much higher than the 
pundits are currently preaching.  For instance, much of the projected cost-efficiency of 
nuclear power lies in the cheapness of nuclear fuel relative to coal, oil, and natural gas.  
However, the price of uranium has experienced a run-up in recent years, and events of an 
uncontrollable nature could raise its price even higher.134 
E.  OTHER INCENTIVES 
 David McLellan, in an article addressing nuclear power in the United Kingdom, 
recommends the use of government regulation and legislation to make tax and other 
incentives, such as a tax on carbon-emissions, that will make “nuclear power economics” 
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more attractive and agreeable and inspire construction of new plants and transition to 
nuclear power.135  Many of McLellan’s suggestions have already been considered or 
implemented in the United States, either at the state or federal levels.  The Energy Policy 
Act of 2005’s (EPACT) passage created strong financial incentives for power companies 
to invest in nuclear energy.  In addition to production, it results in 1.8 cents per kilowatt-
hour tax credits.  Further, for the first eight years of operation, EPACT offers “standby 
support” to power companies and plant operators of up to $500 million to cover cost 
overruns liable to demanding holdups for the first two new nuclear reactors built and an 
amount equal to half of the cost of regulatory delays, or the lesser of $250 million for 
each of the next four plants built.136  Taken together, these are incredibly strong financial 
incentives for utility companies to move into nuclear power.  As Paul Jaskow of MIT 
notes, “[c]learly, a subsidy of about “$20/mwh plus insurance against the cost of 
regulatory delay is a significant incentive for nuclear plant investment s that are eligible 
to receive the subsidy.  It is equivalent to placing a price of about $25/ton of carbon 
dioxide emissions from pulverized coal plants.”137  
 Despite the power of these financial incentives, some analysts are more 
pessimistic about the future success of nuclear energy and critical of the industry’s claims 
of cost-effectiveness.  For instance, Craig Severance notes that cost overruns and 
construction delays led to the cancellation of more than 130 nuclear construction projects 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  He sees little evidence that nuclear plant design and associated 
technology has changed so substantially as to prevent history from repeating itself.138  
Severance views the current optimistic fervor over nuclear energy to be the product of 
wishful thinking at best and a willful distortion of the economic realities at worst.  
Pointing out that “[e]stimates for new nuclear power place these facilities among the 
costliest private projects ever undertaken,” Severance cautions that power companies are 
exploiting concerns over global warming, arguing that utility companies have an 
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“incentive” to sell nuclear energy to the American public because of the until-recently 
high price of natural gas as well as the fact that new state regulations (and potential 
federal regulations) restricting or taxing carbon emissions have made it more difficult 
effectively to operate coal-powered energy plants.139  As Severance notes, federal 
authority was granted in 2007 for federal loan guarantees of $18.5 billion for nuclear 
plant construction, in addition to the other financial incentives included in EPACT.  
 Severance further disputes the notion that natural-gas-generated electricity is 
more costly than nuclear electricity.  Indeed, he counters the claims of utility companies 
that nuclear energy is the least expensive clean energy option available, asserting that  
Independent studies have concluded new nuclear power is not 
economically competitive. Given this discrepancy [between the claims of 
utility companies and independent studies of nuclear energy], [the nuclear 
industry’s] history of cost overruns, and the fact new generation designs 
have never been constructed anywhere, there is a major business risk 
nuclear power will be more costly than projected. 
—Craig A. Severance, Business Risks and Costs of New Nuclear Power 
On the other hand, Severance argues, natural gas plants have come close to perfecting 
cost-efficiency in energy delivery.  Furthermore, the answer to the current energy debacle 
may not be nuclear plants but rather plants that run on both natural gas and some form of 
bio-or recycled fuel.  Severance cites plants that operate “through a combination of 
aggressive load reduction incentives to customers, better grid management, and a mixture 
of renewable energy sources supply zero-fuel-cost kilowatt hours backed by the kilowatt 
capacity of natural gas turbines where needed” in his book. 
 Severance warns that construction delays would reduce power company credit 
rates and generate funding shortfalls. He predicts that, if the nuclear industry does 
experience shortfalls, it will be passed on to the consumer in the form of high electricity 
costs, resulting in negative economic pressure, in those regions of the United States 
whose energy needs are serviced by nuclear plants.  According to Severance, the utility 
companies have little to lose by transitioning to nuclear efforts because their expenses in 
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doing so will be heavily subsidized by federal grants, loans, and tax breaks and their 
interests will be protected by the ability to pass costs on to the American citizenry in the 
form of more expensive electricity. He also claims that various estimates of the cost of 
nuclear energy do not take into account such costs as property taxes, regulatory 
compliance, and, especially, the expenses entailed in waste management and disposal. He 
predicts that, if nuclear-generated electricity is much more expensive than anticipated for 
the consumer to purchase, it will meet with low demand, and that the nuclear industry, as 
a business concern, will find itself in jeopardy, much as it did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s. 
 While many of Severance’s criticisms may be reasonable, the true future of 
nuclear power lies somewhere between his dark assessment and the rosier prospects 
envisioned by McLellan and Meserve and Moniz. Paul Joskow, of MIT, predicts that the 
nuclear industry will grow but more slowly than the optimistic forecasts. While he 
recognizes the impact of the financial incentives provided by EPACT, he expects that 
certain parts of the country will be more welcoming of nuclear than others.140  
Specifically, Joskow foresees areas of the country with a significant amount of already-
existing nuclear infrastructure to be the first to embrace the Nuclear Renaissance. 
However, he points to “[u]nresolved trash removal guidelines and regional resistance to 
new nuclear plants as “likely . . . barriers to investment in new nuclear power plants in 
some areas of the country.”141   
 Joskow explains the consolidation in the nuclear industry and the scramble for 
license renewals as a consequence of substantial increases in the performance of nuclear 
plants and in the cost of alternative fuels and electricity costs. He also notes the cost of 
constructing a coal or natural gas plant from scratch costs more than the principal 
expenses needed for continuing the life of existing power plants.  However, Joskow 
makes a distinction between acquiring and operating already-existing nuclear plants and 
constructing a new plant.  While the capital costs of acquiring an older but still working 
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nuclear power plant are minimal, the upfront costs of constructing a new power plant can 
be staggering.  Joskow points out that, until recently, there was very little investment 
interest in nuclear energy and that most of the current interest, shown by industry 
consolidation and license renewals, has been manifested not by investors, but by the 
energy industry itself.142  In a competitive, deregulated market, it is the investor who has 
the greatest power.  He notes that,   
…on a going forward basis private investors in new nuclear plants must 
expect to recover both their operating costs and the much higher capital 
costs of building a new plant from revenues earned from electricity 
produced by the plant.  The necessary revenues must come either from 
sales of power at market prices in states that have adopted competitive 
market models or through regulated retail prices determined through the 
regulatory process in states where generation investments are still subject 
to regulation. 
—Joskow, The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States 
While there has been some recent investor interest in nuclear energy, Joskow 
attributes this to the passage of EPACT with its overall financial package for plant 
owners and operators, as well as to the widely held expectation that the federal 
government will eventually pass a carbon-emission tax or other disincentives that will 
result in a large-scale abandonment of coal in the industry. He says, despite EPACT, 
however, investors in nuclear plants will still carry risks of construction cost overruns, 
market price variations, and plant shut-downs. Jaskow, also notes that the effects of 
EPACT on long-term business and investor incentives are uncertain because the subsidies 
phase out after the first few years of plant operation. 
 Moreover, Jaskow concludes, based on a life-cycle cost comparison that a nuclear 
plant is not competitive with coal-powered plants in terms of production costs and is only 
competitive with natural-gas-powered plants when the price of natural gas is high. He 
estimates construction costs for a new nuclear plant need to drop by 25percent and 
financing costs need to drop to the levels of those currently prevailing for the 
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construction of new coal and natural gas plants in order for nuclear energy to be viable 
with natural products in the energy markets as a cheap fuel source.  
F.  THE MARKET 
 However, Jaskow is not entirely negative in his outlook on nuclear costs.  He 
expects that nuclear energy will not immediately thrive in a deregulated, competitive 
market environment.  He notes that, in some statistics the energy market has not been 
effectively deregulated; some utility companies hold regional monopolies on electricity 
and their prices must therefore be regulated or capped by state commissions and 
governmental authorities.  In these areas, investors will have less influence than state 
governments and regulatory bodies in steering the direction of utility companies.143  He 
expects nuclear power plants to flourish in those areas, as well as in areas where the 
populace is used to nuclear power or is suffering under extremely high electricity rates. 
He also thinks in these latter areas, new nuclear plant construction is less likely to meet 
with local resistance.144  
The directors of a study at the University of Chicago concluded, just as Jaskow 
does, that the popular claims for cheap nuclear electricity are inaccurate.145  The study 
calculated a pre-tax LCOE for nuclear energy ranging from $47 to $71 per megawatt-
hour compared to $33-$41 for coal plants and $35-$45 for natural-gas plants.146  The 
authors of the Chicago study also noted that upfront capital costs were the most important 
determining factor in a nuclear plant’s later profitability and production costs. For nuclear 
plants, upfront capital costs of construction account for one-third of LCOE, while interest 
rates on construction capital make up another quarter of LCOE.147  Furthermore,  
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construction costs for nuclear plants will undoubtedly be difficult to determine and 
incorporate because so little nuclear construction has recently taken place in the United 
States.   
 As the authors of the Chicago study argue,  
[a] case can be made that the nuclear industry will start with very little 
learning from previous experience when the first new nuclear construction 
occurs in the United States.  The paucity of new nuclear construction over 
the past twenty years in the United States, together with the entry of new 
technologies and a new regulatory system, has eliminated much of the 
applicable U.S. experience.  
Furthermore, as the Chicago study notes; early plants will undoubtedly be more 
expensive than later-built plants. The authors of the Chicago study estimate that first-of-
a-kind engineering costs (FOAKE) could increase the construction costs of the first plant 
built by a particular energy company by as much as 35 percent. On a positive note, the 
study concludes that nuclear power plants will become more cost-effective as time goes 
on.  It will also be more effective as experience is gained in constructing and operating 
them while federal incentives and concerns about global warming could provide nuclear 
power a boost in the United States.148 
G.  SUMMARY 
 Despite the optimistic projections of the power industry, the profitability of 
nuclear energy, at least in the short run, is uncertain.  Improvements in technology, plant 
design standardization, concern over global warming, streamlined regulations, federal 
loans, subsidies, and other financial incentives are all expected to play a role in spurring 
growth in the nuclear sector, as well as support cost containment in the creation and 
maneuvering of nuclear plants.  However, the complexity of plant design and operation, 
the fickleness of investors, and the high upfront costs of plant construction all counsel 
towards caution when it comes to predicting the prospect of the nuclear industry in the 
United States.  Perhaps most troubling is the failure to account for specialized plant 
protection, both physical and cyber-oriented, in calculating the cost of constructing and 
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operating a nuclear power plant.  If nuclear plants are, indeed, attractive terrorist targets, 
more-so than other power plants, then some specialized security measures must be 
implemented.  These measures will not likely be inexpensive; however, it appears that no 
serious evaluation of their potential price has been attempted or performed. The next 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 63
VI. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
This chapter explains, using recent attacks on the U.S. infrastructure, DHS’ role to 
respond to these threats.  Threats that have taken place have occurred in the form of 
cyber-threats, such as malicious software and have been seen in the U.S. current nuclear 
infrastructure.  The warning of these attacks has existed for many years, but as this 
chapter outlines, DHS has been re-occurring slow to respond.  Further research also 
needs to be done in this area as it has been under recent cyber attack.  
A.  NATIONAL SECURITY 
The danger posed to national security by potential cyber-terrorists has been 
underscored by events such as the May 2007 denial-of-service attack on the nation of 
Estonia, Internet resulted in the widespread debilitation of government and business Web 
sites and channels of communication.149  The attack on Estonia was only the most 
frightening and high-profile of a number of cyber-incidents, some intentional cyber-
attacks and others unintentional cyber-related disruptions that have highlighted the 
susceptibility of the nation’s infrastructure to cyber-terrorism.   
Intentional cyber-assaults comprise the 1997 disabling of the air-traffic 
communication systems in Worcester, Massachusetts, the use of a radio-transmitter to 
violate the control system of an Australian sewage treatment center by a disgruntled 
former employee in 2000, the disabling of train signaling systems throughout the eastern 
United States as a result of the Sobig computer virus  Other attacks contain the hindering 
of a secure observing system through the blocking of control system communication at 
the Oak Harbor, Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear power plant as a result of the infection of the 
plant’s private computer network by the Microsoft SQL Server worm “Slammer,” and the 
disruption of control systems at thirteen Chrysler manufacturing plants in the mid-
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western United States in August 2005 by the Zotob Worm.150  Almost all of these 
deliberate attacks were domestic with no evidence of international terrorist involvement.   
 Incidents that were not part of a deliberate attack or disabling of a plant or system 
but Internet nevertheless resulted in the disruption of critical operations include the 
August 2003 blackout that affected much of the northeastern portion of the United States.  
This is also attributed in part to the failure of a control system alarm processor and a June 
1999 gasoline pipeline failure in Bellingham, Washington, the results of Internet were 
exacerbated by the inefficient monitoring by control systems.151  All of the above 
incidents occurred in part due to weaknesses in the security measures and protocols 
protecting the control systems of the affected facility. 
 Despite the overwhelming evidence that the nation’s infrastructure is particularly 
vulnerable to breaches of cyber-security, discussions of terrorist attacks centered on 
power plants and other critical facilities tend to focus on potential defenses against 
physical attacks.  The DHS and related federal agencies lag disturbingly in their 
implementation of measures necessary to make certain the cyber-security of this nation’s 
crucial networks. 
B.  DHS AND THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 When specifically addressing security at the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), in the “High Risk” report, the GAO noted that the very foundation of DHS posed 
certain security vulnerabilities because it entailed assimilating twenty-two formerly 
independent agencies and offices into one fully functioning government department.  
Although it praised DHS for the progress it had already made, the GAO noted that the 
agency was still in mid-transition and thus remained highly vulnerable. Based on its 
previous assessments of merged agencies and departments, the GAO voiced that 
“successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous 
                                                 




reorganizations than DHS, can take years to achieve.”152 In particular, the GAO noted in 
this report that DHS had not implemented a “corrective action plan that includes a 
comprehensive transformation strategy” and that its management systems were “not yet 
integrated and wholly operational.” The result is a state of management and operational 
disruption that, as of January 2007, was still hindering the efforts of DHS to fulfill its 
primary functions much less develops advanced security measures.153  Again, the failure 
of DHS, the agency committed to protecting national security, to adequately address its 
own security concerns are disheartening. Among the most concerning of GAO’s 
comments on the DHS was its finding that DHS had not yet performed extensive risk 
assessments in the area of critical infrastructure. Although GAO does say so specifically, 
critical infrastructure would presumably include the nation’s nuclear power plants.154 
 With respect to the nation’s critical infrastructures, the GAO emphasizes the 
importance of developing cyber-security measures to the successful fulfillment of DHS’s 
responsibilities and those of its National Cyber-Security Division (NCD).  According to 
the GAO, the DHS and the NCD still needed to complete the following tasks: 
“developing a national plan for critical infrastructure protection, including cyber-security; 
planning for and coordinating cyber-incident response and recovery; and identifying and 
assessing cyber-threats and vulnerabilities.”155  In this same report, the GAO, reviewed 
the progress of DHS in these areas, Internet included establishing a U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team, and “developing high-level plans for infrastructure 
protection and incident response” and orchestrating emergency response exercises 
involving simulated cyber-attacks and cyber-crises so that federal agencies and corporate 
entities could evaluate and improve their readiness. However, the GAO concluded, quite 
alarmingly, that “DHS has not yet completely fulfilled any of its key responsibilities,” 
noting in particular that DHS had, as of reporting time, failed to achieve national 
                                                 






assessments of vulnerability to cyber-threats or initiate recovery plans for cyber-security 
systems in either the public or the private arenas.156  The DHS faces admittedly stubborn 
opposition from private sector infrastructure-sensitive industries when it comes to making 
security assessments and implementing security measures. As the GAO explained, 
private industry is notoriously reluctant to provide information to governmental agencies, 
and the current lack of departmental unity at DHS further undermines the agency’s 
authority in the eyes of private actors. However, GAO’s ultimate conclusion concerning 
DHS’s cyber-readiness is a chilling one: “Until DHS fulfills its cyber-security 
responsibilities, our nation’s critical infrastructures will remain at risk” in its “High Risk 
Series” report. 
 In congressional testimony in 2009, David Powner, Director of Information 
Technology Management Issues at GAO, argued that DHS had insufficiently addressed 
its responsibilities with respect to securing critical infrastructure and key federal 
operations against cyber-threats.157  Powner argued that current cyber-security breaches 
and attacks in the United States and elsewhere highlighted both the need to protect 
infrastructure and operations from such events as well as the lack of DHS’s efforts to 
develop a meaningful and useful security protocol.158  As Powner noted in the GAO 
Report, Critical Infrastructure Protection, the DHS is “the focal point for coordinating 
cyber-security, including making it responsible for protecting systems that support 
critical infrastructures, a practice commonly referred to as cyber critical infrastructure 
protection.” He went on to state that the GAO has been asking the DHS to improve its 
cyber-security measures since 2005. In its capacity as the agency responsible for 
preserving national security, the DHS has been designated as the frontline responder and 
coordinator for U.S. cyber-security efforts.159 Given the DHS’s leadership role in cyber-
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security, the fact that the DHS has been so slow to meet minimum requirements 
regarding security measures points to national vulnerabilities in key areas.  Most notable 
are the nation’s power supply and power distribution infrastructure, Internet includes 
nuclear power plants.  
 In July 2008, the GAO found that the Computer Readiness Team assembled by 
the DHS had failed to address fifteen “key cyber-analysis and warning attributes.” 
according to Powers. Specifically, the GAO noted that warnings and notifications issued 
by the Computer Readiness Team were “not consistently actionable or timely.”160  He 
also documents the GAO also reported that DHS had not established a viable,  
coordinated plan for improving the security of key control systems.  Further review by 
Powers as of 2009, the DHS had not fully addressed the deficiencies noted in earlier 
GAO reports. 
C.  AREAS OF CONCERN 
 The GAO reviewed and reported weaknesses in six major areas of concern with 
respect to cyber-security: 1) bolstering cyber-analysis and warning capabilities; 2) 
reducing organizational inefficiency with respect to implementing cyber-security 
measures, 3) the successful implementation and completion of cyber-exercises, 4) 
developing sector-specific plans addressing cyber-security concerns, 5) improving cyber-
measures and protocols protecting the control systems of critical national infrastructure, 
and 6) improving the ability of the DHS to recover from cyber-attacks and other Internet-
service disruptions.161  Powers spends a lot of his writing on the GAO concluded that, 
while the DHS had taken steps to fulfill its mission in all six areas, it had not yet fully 
met its responsibilities in any one of them. While the DHS has managed to achieve some 
cyber-security measures, the sophistication and effectiveness of those measures is 
uncertain.  For instance, the GAO concluded that, while the DHS had the ability to 
identify the characteristics of events constituting cyber-threats or attacks, it had not taken 
                                                 




the progressive step of developing systems of prediction and analysis that could warn of 
possible attacks or respond to and analyze various, simultaneous threats to cyber-security.  
He states, according to the GAO, the DHS “d [oes] not possesses the resources to handle 
multiple [cyber] events across the nation.”162  
 Without specifically mentioning nuclear power plants, the GAO made special 
note of the deficiencies in the DHS’s cyber-readiness with respect to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  Specifically, Powner writes that the GAO found that the plans that the 
DHS had drafted for infrastructural cyber-security were not fully inclusive of relevant 
and necessary cyber-security factors and considerations. He explains in, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, some of these key factors and considerations included a 
method for identifying potential consequences of a cyber-attack and the development of 
incentives for the implementation of voluntary risk assessments by private actors in 
certain industrial sectors related to infrastructure. Of special concern is the security and 
protection of infrastructure control systems.  In addition, Powner writes that the GAO 
noted that the DHS “had not established a strategy to coordinate the various control 
systems activities across federal agencies and the private sector.”  
 Although the GAO expressed concern about the implementation of cyber-security 
measures for control systems, disproportionately more attention has been paid to 
protecting information systems than to protecting control systems.  Control systems have 
been addressed almost as an afterthought, and only after information security have been 
addressed.  When the importance of control systems to the nation’s infrastructure is 
acknowledged, the nuclear energy industry is rarely, if ever, specifically identified as a 
critical concern for cyber-security concerns.  For instance, in December 2007, the 
Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), an office of the U.S. Department of Commerce, issued recommendations for the 
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implementation of security controls for federal information systems.163  The NIST’s 
recommendations in 2007 focused exclusively on developing and implementing security 
measures for information systems in accordance with the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA).164  NIST did not issue a statement or recommendations on 
cyber-security for industrial control systems until almost a year later.165  The NIST report 
on control systems noted their critical role in infrastructure such as electric power, the 
water supply, oil and natural gas distribution, the transportation system, the food supply, 
and the nation’s manufacturing industry.166  However, the report makes no specific 
mention of the nuclear industry. 
The lack of rigorous attention to the cyber-security of industrial control systems 
for critical infrastructures in general, and the nuclear energy industry in particular, 
highlights glaring weaknesses in the cyber-security measures implemented thus far by the 
DHS.  As NIST notes, control arrangements are crucial to the operating of important 
organizational industries in the United States.167  From Stouffer’s, Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems Security, the NIST also points out a fact that heightens the problem that 
the DHS and its affiliated agencies face in ensuring the cyber-security of the nation’s 
infrastructure:  He also states that private industry manages nearly 90 percent of the 
nation’s most critical infrastructures.  Further, he indicates that NIST accurately pinpoints 
the potential vulnerabilities that are arising as more and more corporate industries in the 
area of critical infrastructure improve their control and operations systems and being able 
to connect them to the information systems.   
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Stouffer notes, as NIST notes, the cyber-security measures related to information 
systems are often entirely inappropriate and ineffective for control systems. Indeed 
Stouffer’s work shows that NIST acknowledges that brand new security measures 
designed specifically for control systems may be needed for proper protection of the 
nation’s infrastructure. Additionally, in Stouffer’s, Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
Security, the following pages are clearly detailed on NIST’s report on industrial control 
systems painstakingly details the different types of control systems and their differences 
from traditional information systems. NIST also catalogues potential cyber-threats and 
cyber-incidents that could damage, disable, compromise, disrupt or destroy the 
functioning of an industrial control system, including blocking the flow of information 
through control system networks, rewriting of control system commands and instructions 
and modifying software and configuration settings, and feeding inaccurate information 
into the control system. Indeed, NIST makes a number of sensible suggestions for 
enhancing control system security, including the establishment of firewalls and the use of 
independent authentication mechanisms for control systems, restricting physical access to  
computer components critical to the control system performance, and creating redundant 
counterparts for control system components so as to maintain functionality during cyber-
attacks and other incidents. 
 Stouffer explains factors that complicate the linking of control systems with 
information systems include the differing goals of the departments that utilize 
information systems and those that handle control systems. While confidentiality is of 
utmost importance in information security, plant safety and system availability and 
functioning are the priorities with respect to control system security. Information and 
control systems also differ in terms of standards and thresholds that they apply in terms 
of reliability, performance, communication protocols, and system design and 
functioning.168 
 Although NIST acknowledges that private industry manages most of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, it offers only cursory recommendations for resolving the inherent 
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tensions that arise between these private owners and federal regulators when it comes to 
formulating and enforcing security requirements in general and cyber-security 
requirements in particular.  NIST recommends developing a “compelling business case” 
for the implementation of an effective cyber-security program for industrial control 
systems.169  Stouffer feels that such a business case would involve presenting cost and 
damage scenarios in the event a control system is insufficiently protected during a cyber-
attack.  Such a business case would probably necessitate drawing upon the resources and 
expertise of industrial trade groups and consulting firms with both experience and an 
established reputation in the relevant industry.  An effective “business case” would also 
include accurate and reasonable cost estimates for implementing the recommended or 
required cyber-security measures. However, these suggestions for creating a “compelling 
business case” do little to solve the fundamental question of lack of incentives to private 
owners of critical infrastructures, such as nuclear power plants to voluntarily adopt vital 
security protocols and solutions. 
D.  THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND PLANT 
SECURITY 
 In its investigations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and nuclear power 
plant security, the GAO has identified corporate influence on federal regulators and the 
regulatory process as a factor that compromises efforts to improve plant protection with 
potentially severe consequences. Wells in, Design Basis Threat Process Should be 
Improved, the GAO reviewed the NRC’s process for amending the Design Basis Threat 
(DBT), the document that sets forth the hypothetical terrorist attacks and security threats, 
Internet are used to safeguard against the nuclear plants. As the GAO explains, “[t]he 
DBT characterizes the elements of a potential attack, including the number of attackers, 
their training, and weapons and tactics they are capable of employing.”170  The GAO 
concluded that the NRC’s process for revising the DBT was insufficient.  In particular, 
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the GAO found that many of the changes that the NRC implemented in the DBT were 
instituted in response to the suggestion, influence, and pressure of representatives of the 
nuclear industry.171  Wells states that in April 2003, the DBT was revised following 
concerns raised after of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  He is critical that while the GAO 
approved of many of the changes to the DBT, including an increase in the number of 
attackers and a growth in the range of resources that could be employed during an assault 
on a nuclear plant, it noted that other changes, including what weapons attackers could 
assault a plant with, were influenced by industry feedback.  
 He writes in Design Base Threat Process, again the GAO noted that the NRC 
made initial recommendations for revising the DBT and then sent the draft DBT to 
industry leaders for discussion. According to the GAO and Wells, “NRC specifically 
sought and received feedback from the nuclear industry on what is reasonable for a 
private security force to defend against and the cost of and time frame for implementing 
security measures to defend against specific adversary characteristics” in the “High Risk 
Report” also accounts how the GAO also noted that, in many cases, the NRC altered its 
initial proposal after considering industry commentary on the draft.  For instance, the 
NRC excluded some of the arms from the catalog of the protection of nuclear power 
plants that should be required to protect against after industry representatives complained 
that effectively defending against these weapons would be prohibitively expensive. 
Another example given by Wells, Internet industry representatives argued the vehicle 
bomb was too large in the draft-revised DBT. Industry representatives reportedly 
contended that the possibility of terrorists using a vehicle bomb of such magnitude was 
extremely small.  Further, Wells explains that such a powerful bomb would be detected 
by federal authorities before reaching the nuclear plant. Numerous plants would be 
unable to effectively defend themselves against a bomb of such magnitude because they 
lacked the land required to install effective vehicle barrier systems.  In addition, Wells  
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shows that industry stakeholders objected to the inclusion of a specific proposed weapon 
in the DBT because each plant would incur annual costs of up to $2 million in order to 
defend against it.  
In addition, the NRC removed from the DBT a number of other weapons to 
Internet the industry representatives voiced objections.172  The GAO concluded that, in a 
number of instances, the NRC altered the DBT based not on its best judgment regarding 
the form a likely terrorist attack would take but rather “based on what industry considered 
reasonable and feasible to defend against.”173  Wells writes the GAO recommended that 
the NRC improve its DBT revision process by segregating the NRC department or 
services directly responsible for soliciting and reviewing industry feedback on the DBT 
from that responsible for approving changes to the DBT. 
 Moreover, the rate of plant inspections and observations of DBT-based force-on-
force exercises is extremely slow.  As of November 2005, Wells documents in, Design 
Basis Threat Process Should be Improved, only 31 percent of the sites had completed 
NRC inspections.  At this rate, Well’s criticizes, the NRC would be able to assess the 
security measures implemented at each plant only once every eight years. The NRC has 
since promised to increase the amount of plant inspections from once every eight years to 
once every three years.  
E.  INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
The issue of industry influence on regulatory requirements could be of paramount 
consideration when it comes to requiring private owners of critical infrastructures, 
especially nuclear power plants, to achieve effective cyber-security measures.  Many of 
the vulnerabilities currently facing nuclear plants have arisen due to rapid evolution of 
cyber-technologies.  Plants transitioning from outdated analog control systems to new 
digitized control systems are interfacing with already existing corporate information 
technology systems.  Cyber-technology, especially the technology related to cyber-
security measures, is subject to sudden and drastic change.  Moreover, while cyber-
                                                 
172 Wells, Design Basis Threat Process Should be Improved, 6–10. 
173 Ibid. 
 74
security for information technology systems is a well-developed field, control systems’ 
cyber-security is still an emerging discipline.  Implementing effective security measures 
for new digitized control systems in nuclear plants will require not only the purchase and 
configuration of software and the installation of new systems but also the hiring and 
training of employees who will be able to understand and apply the latest security 
protocols.  Because control system cyber-security is a nascent field, the nuclear energy 
industry may be required to engage in a significant amount of research and subsequent 
development in order to obtain an acceptable level of cyber-protection.  It will most 
likely be required for individual plants to maintain control security experts as consultants, 
and, since so few of these experts currently exist, these consulting services will probably 
be very costly to plant owners and operators.   
 Achieving cyber-security, particularly with respect to plant control systems will, 
at the least, prove inconvenient to owners of nuclear power plants.  The nuclear energy 
industry will almost certainly incur substantial costs through the development and 
implementation of the necessary security protocols.  The DHS and the NRC will almost 
certainly encounter resistance on the part of the nuclear energy industry to adopting 
recommended control system security measures.  Any suggestion for improving the 
security of nuclear power plants must, therefore, also include specific steps for 
motivating and incentivizing the commercial plant owners who will be required to make 
the upfront capital investments necessary to achieve the necessary cyber-security 
measures and protocols.  In addition, because control system security is such a new field, 
frequent testing of the cyber-security measures implemented by nuclear power plants will 
initially be required in order to ensure their success.  During this period—when the 
industry and the relevant agencies are themselves just beginning to explore the 
technology required to achieve cyber-security for nuclear power plants, it must be the 
current state of the technology and the compelling need to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure that sets the tone and defines the standard.  This is especially the case when 




owners, the DHS, the NRC, and related agencies must be immune from industry pressure 
if the federal government is to successfully prepare for and protect against terrorist 
threats against nuclear power plants. 
F.  SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the many aspects of the role that the Department of 
Homeland security has with nuclear power plants. It has highlighted areas of concern by 
GAO reports. It also reviewed the role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and plant 
security, Internet is evaluated by the Design Base Threat Process. Furthermore, it 
explains the industry’s influence of the protection of the physical plant and the IT 
systems. The next chapter takes a look at Europe and its issues with nuclear power plants. 
Europe has had to deal with much larger protest groups against nuclear power than have 
been experienced in the U.S. Yet, European nations continue to expand their nuclear 
power generation, and nations such as France continue to develop new nuclear power 
generation technologies that have put it ahead of the U.S. in power generation 
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VII. EUROPE’S ISSUES WITH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
 This paper’s primary focus has been on the United States issues with nuclear 
power plants. However, energy is a complex issue that all states must deal with and find 
long-term solutions. This chapter explains how the European Union has made long-term 
goals in energy distribution.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union has complicated the 
energy supply and distribution between many European states in sharing energy 
resources in both fossil fuels and nuclear energy. To complicate matter due to expansion 
of the EU, one of the EU’s membership requirements was decommissioning of older 
nuclear power plants, mostly in the former Soviet states as these plants are deemed 
unsafe but they have few financial resources to decommission or build new ones.  The 
challenges of the newer EU states are demonstrated in examination of three members, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Lithuania.   
Since Europe is dependent on imports of energy and most of its raw 
materials, it can be subdued, if not quite conquered, without all those 
nuclear weapons the Soviets have aimed at it simply through the shipping 
routes and raw materials they control. 
—Barbara Amiel 174 
A.  ENERGY IS A COMMODITY 
Since energy is a commodity, there are four significant distinctiveness of power 
marketplaces that need to be understood: (1) transportation in the United States and 
Europe is essentially extremely oil based, and the worldwide demand for worldwide oil 
has increased due to the expanding economies of China and India; among others; (2) 
carbon-based energy provides most of the non-transportation energy such as electricity 
production, heating, and commercial power; (3) governmental spending is insignificant in 
terms of energy research and development; (4) a global revolution is required in energy 
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production to support energy that is sufficient, economical and sustainable.175 These 
characteristics do not let the energy market self correct by supply and demand. It cannot 
self correct because demand is a certainty that drives the economic activity of each 
country. Therefore, it becomes a “must pay” bill.   
B.  THE ENERGY SYSTEM IN EUROPE 
European countries are challenged by the system that they must use in addressing 
energy issues since various departments of government organize separate divisions of 
energy policies and regulations. There are many moving pieces from different actors in 
the government and economic process such as the European Union’s Council of 
Ministers, the European Commission, and state governments, Internet all set goals that 
must be implemented through directives from the Commission, legislation from the 
European Parliament, and then national legislation.176  In January 2007, the European 
Commission published “An Energy for Europe”. It focused on three goals: (1) combating 
climate change, (2) encouraging expansion and jobs, and (3) offering safe and reasonable 
energy to clients.177 
In November 2007, the European Commission published “A European Strategic 
Energy Technology Plan” that identified technology that would help the European Union 
to achieve its stated energy goals. The primary concern was to strengthen research to 
lower costs and improve the performance of the current infrastructure and to promote 
business opportunities to stimulate market development. This plan outlined two notable 
things for nuclear power in Europe. First, it urges the European Union to utilize a single 
electric grid supplying renewable energy sources; second, it calls for the EU to remain 
competitive in fission technologies combined with long term waste solutions. 178 
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1.  European Union Policy on Nuclear Power Plants 
 Energy supply security and nuclear power has become a focused interest item in 
the EU in order to secure energy supplies and also to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.179  
The EU expanded from 12 to 27 states, yet reduced the percentage of member countries 
with antinuclear stances. This is because many of the newer members are experiencing 
energy shortfalls.  The issue of electricity security varies across the EU.  Western 
European states have a robust and flexible electricity system and stabilized markets.180  
For them, nuclear power plants are just one option to consider as a future source of 
energy. Many Central and Eastern European states, however, depend on Russia for 
natural gas.  These countries have a reasonable apprehension of their dependence on 
Russian natural gas to provide for their electricity requirements. In addition, many of 
these same countries have limited electrical interconnections, gas distribution pipeline 
problems, and increased policy pressure from western EU states to decommission Soviet-
era legacy nuclear plants. 181  
 European nuclear power is formed by two predominant regulations—one, the 
regulation of electricity markets; second, the safe regulation and handling of dangerous 
and politically controversial technology.182  At the heart of the matter is economics. 
Western European states have enough electricity from current sources to meet their 
economic and public needs.  Although Central and Eastern European states’ economies  
and populations have been shrinking in recent years, they still need a continuous secure 
electrical power grid. Moreover, these states aspire to support growing economic and 
populations in the future.   
 On June 23, 2009, the EU established a Community framework for the safety of 
nuclear installations.183 The primary focus established of this community framework is 
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the national responsibility of member states for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. 
Each member state may decide on its energy mix in accordance with relevant national 
policies. While the document addresses the importance of safe management of spent fuel 
and radioactive waste, there is no clear objective as to when this subject should be 
readdressed and solutions agreed upon. Furthermore, the European High Level Group on 
Nuclear Safety and Waste Management was established, but there does not seem to be an 
enforcement authority for this organization.184 In the EU, there is a question as to 
whether there should be a central nuclear waste disposal site for all member states. 185  
As in the United States, one of the serious obstacles to expanding nuclear power is the 
requirement for investments from public and private sources to fund the energy sector. 
186 Currently, Bulgaria is the only EU member that has two new nuclear power plant 
units under construction (since September 2009) that are fully funded projects.187 
 The EU has worked to establish uniform safety standards for nuclear power 
plants.  Article 2 of the Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of the European 
Atomic Community (Euratom). However, the EU struggles with the legal issues 
concerning nuclear safety and requirements, since it is an individual state’s right and 
responsibility to safeguard its nuclear program.188  
Another contentious issue within the EU is the proposed model of decommission 
financing. This is particularly problematic for newer EU members that have to give up 
their nuclear power plants because they do not meet the safety requirements outlined in 
the treaties.189  Currently there are 152 reactors spread over the EU providing 30 percent  
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of EU electricity. The planned or required phase out of reactors will reduce the level of 
electricity currently utilized.190  The essence of the problem is the upfront investment of 
two to three billion euros to build new plants.  Most recent EU members do not have the 
resources to finance new plants on their own or to decommission their old nuclear plants.   
C.   NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS IN NEWER EU MEMBERS 
This section reviews the nuclear power plant programs in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Lithuania. These countries were chosen for the following reasons: 
(1) Bulgaria had to shut down two nuclear power plants under duress.  Although 
Bulgaria needed the electricity that the plants generated, shutting them down was a 
requirement for EU entry. Nuclear power provides 35 percent of its electrical grid. 
Bulgaria is dependent on Russian gas.   
Indeed, Russia provides 90 percent of Bulgaria’s supply, though Bulgaria is 
looking for other options for energy. 191   
(2) Lithuania depends on its Soviet-designed nuclear power plant for 70percent of 
its electrical requirements. For its natural gas power plants, it depends on Russian 
suppliers for 90 percent of its gas. The EU is subsidizing the decommissioning of the 
remaining Soviet-era reactor.  This nuclear power plant is a Soviet-built RBMK-2 nuclear 
power plant.  This is the same design as was in Chernobyl, Ukraine, and met with a 
nuclear disaster.  However, Lithuania has entered into a partnership with Estonia, Latvia 
and Poland to construct a new nuclear power plant.  Financial support will be given by 
the government of Lithuania and privately held companies in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
192 
(3) Hungary operates four Soviet-designed reactors at one operating nuclear 
power plant, Paks. It has no plans to shut down its power plant and continues to invest in 
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training and safety programs.   It has operated one nuclear power plant successfully since 
the mid 1970s.  Its reactors produce 40 percent of its electrical power grid’s needs.  These 
reactors’ output does not provide enough electricity, so it also uses gas and coal powered 
electrical plants.  This results in high energy costs for consumers in Hungary and in 
neighboring states who share some of the nuclear-generated power. 193 
1. Bulgaria 
Although Bulgaria was forced by the EU to shut down two of its aging nuclear 
power plants, it has not had assistance from the EU to replace them.  Only two 1,000 
mega-watt units are now in operation, resulting in a substantial lack of electrical energy 
supplies in the region.194  The German power company RWE was chosen to co-build a 
2,000 mega-watt nuclear reactor in Belene, Bulgaria, in conjunction with the Bulgarian 
government-owned company BEH.  However, RWE cannot now provide the money to 
invest in other projects due to the overall poor global economic situation.  RWE has 
backed out of other nations’ projects as well.  “This was also the third project in Central 
and Eastern Europe that RWE had pulled out of in as many weeks—it ended talks to buy 
a stake in the Polish utility Enea and withdrew from an LNG project in Croatia.”195  This 
has opened the door to the most probable investor—Russia.  This takes jobs away from 
the EU and also takes regulation of the construction out of the EU’s control.  "The 
financial difficulties of Belene may turn out to be an excellent opportunity for Russia to 
realize its objective of entering the EU nuclear power sector."196 Bulgaria will not want 
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project.  Russia has been the only serious investor, Internet is ironic as Bulgaria’s 
reactors, Internet were ordered to be decommissioned by the EU, were originally built 
under the Soviet empire.197   
2. Lithuania 
Lithuania shares much the same current fate as Bulgaria. The co-op energy 
consortium of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to build a new nuclear reactor lacks 
a strategic investor to front the majority of the funds.198  All of these countries are reliant 
on Russia for electricity and natural gas, raising the costs of energy.  Shutting down the 
Ignalina power plant, ordered by the EU, has caused an energy deficiency in the region.  
“The Ignalina nuclear plant closure will deepen the recession, more than double power-
generation costs and force Lithuania and the region to import electricity. At present, 
Ignalina supplies about 80 percent of Lithuania’s electricity.”199 Five billion euros are 
needed for the consortium project, and according to Lithuania’s energy minister, whoever 
the strategic investor may be will have to front up to half of the cost.200  The EU has 
driven these states to comply with the EU directives on greenhouse emissions and nuclear 
safety, but has not provided them with the financial support needed to construct new  
nuclear power plants to meet their energy needs.  Sharing the costs of the construction, as 
well as the energy provided by the nuclear plants is, one of the few options available to 
these states. 
Energy sharing is partly driven by being a signatory to the European Energy 
Community Treaty, Internet entered in force on July 1, 2006. However, all EU members 
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have the right to participate since the language is unclear at any interpretation.201  The 
original purpose of the treaty was to promote cross-border sharing of energy resources.   
3. Hungary 
Hungary, as one of the principal producers but yet under-producing for its region, 
is one of the central states expected to participate.  The government has proposed to 
expand capacity in its existing plants, and its parliament has already voted largely in 
favor of building and maneuvering of a new nuclear power plant by around the year 
2020.   
 When Peter Honig spoke at the 53rd General Conference of the IAEA in 2009, he 
explained Hungary’s nuclear power plan.202 Hungary remains committed to the 
parameters laid out by the IAEA and remains a strong supporter of its programs.  
Hungary has extensive use of nuclear energy and endorses only peaceful use of nuclear 
energy in general.  He urged all members of the EU to sign, ratify, and implement a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocols, Internet will include a 
layer of safeguards against manmade disasters. Furthermore, he acknowledged that more 
countries need to implement safeguards for nuclear energy, that there are budgetary 
issues that must be dealt with for nuclear power, and that security in terms of energy and 
physical plant security needs continued work and improvements.   
 To meet Hungary’s need for energy and hedge for energy for its economic and 
social needs Hungary’s Parliament has passed a decision paving the way to build new 
units at the Paks nuclear power plant.203  The resolution mandates the government to 
execute an environmental assessment, study energy markets and then contract for units to 
increase capacity. For the time being, Hungary’s current four units that are in the Paks 
nuclear power plant were given a lifetime extension by the Hungarian Atomic Energy 
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Authority. In addition, by the end of this year the power upgrade should be completed, 
bringing Hungary closer to meeting its domestic requirements. 
Hungary has taken the first steps in meeting the responsibility of its radioactive 
waste. It has identified a site for the National Radioactive Waste Repository for low and 
intermediate waste.204 The above ground facility opened in September 2008, and the 
underground disposal chambers should be operational at the end of 2010.  This will affect 
Russia, since before the repository completion all radioactive waste was sent back to 
Russia for disposal.  To further support nuclear power the government of Hungary has 
offered its nuclear experts to EU member states to share its knowledge and reinforce 
cooperation among the member states for nuclear energy. 
D.  ENERGY SHARING 
The EU favors energy sharing. It has recognized that it will have a steady increase 
in energy needs and that the current energy model based on fossil fuel has two crucial 
flaws. The first flaw is that the European Union imports almost all of its oil requirements 
from Russia, Internet forces it to be dependent on Russian oil. The second flaw is that the 
alternative to gas and oil from Russia is dependence on oil from the Middle East. In 
addition, the volatility of rising prices and world competition for the oil resources from 
either Russia or the Middle East cause a financial burden on member governments and 
businesses, Internet hampers economic growth and development.  
Nuclear power is currently viewed by the EU as an alternative to integrate the 
energy market, and to encourage development in the energy sector and initiatives in areas 
such as infrastructure expansion, investment financing, and research and development.205  
The long-term goal would be that member states would have access to modern and 
affordable energy that offers secure supply and reliability options and that nuclear power 
would be acceptable to European social and environmental concerns.  
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E.  ENERGY SECURITY 
The EU’s primary concern, in terms of energy security in today’s current 
structure, is the potential interruption to gas and oil pipelines. A secondary concern is the 
world demand for oil, followed by the third concern of the pumping stations. The last 
concern is resource nationalism that always has the potential to emerge, particularly in 
politically difficult or economic downturns. The EU is in the process of hedging against 
the first threat of potential interruption. The EU has asked member states to store the oil 
and gas reserves that are outlined in the European Energy Charter. It has been recognized 
by all member states that this plan is a short term solution at best, and that the long term 
solution has to be a renewable energy source that the EU can manage and sustain on its 
own. The EU has recognized that to counter the second-order concern of world demand 
for oil it simply must find alternate methods for energy sources.  
The third concern of pumping stations is an issue that the EU is still struggling 
with currently since the pumping stations constitute a twofold problem.  The first hurdle 
it must overcome is most of the pumping stations are national assets owned and run by 
the governments, so as long as each government is following the treaty or bilateral 
agreement then all is well. However, if a government chooses not to honor its obligations, 
there is no other course of action than diplomatic resolutions to resolve the turmoil-- there 
is remarkably little the other countries can do. The other problem is that pumping stations 
are security vulnerability. If they come under a terrorist attack and become 
nonoperational, not only does it affect the primary state running the pump; it also affects 
other countries that depend on that pumping station, therefore, having a cascade effect on 
the whole system.  
The fourth concern of nationalism of resources is an issue that the EU must 
contend with across the board on a variety of issues. The purpose of the EU is to work 
together to succeed and take the comparative advantage of membership. The EU as a 
collective group is working hard to solve the issue of energy, and it will undoubtedly 
require a long time to work through, but since the EU was able to persuade many its 
members to give up their national currency there is nothing to deem that it will not be 
able to solve its energy dilemma. Adopting the euros was decision for the member states 
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of the EU. As this paper points out, the energy questions involve parties outside the EU, 
including Russia and states in the Middle East.  
Nuclear power plants provide some long-term solutions for the EU energy 
outlook.  They help alleviate the security threats that stem from concerns about shipping 
choke points and pumping stations.  Nuclear plants could provide an alternative energy 
source so that the EU would not have to import as much oil from Russia or the Middle 
East.  However, nuclear power plants would not solve two issues of state’s owned assets 
or vulnerability to terrorist attacks, Internet could have a cascade effect on the members 
depending on the energy that particular nuclear plant would provide.  
F.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 Energy is a critical requirement for every state, Internet is why each state 
evaluates its nuclear power plants in terms of national security, economics, and security 
against manmade disasters.  Energy drives several security factors that are more sensitive 
in the European Union in comparison to the United States since the European Union has 
few resources of its own and limited options to choose from as well.206  
 Even though the European Union must solve its own energy problem, it has 
embraced the Transatlantic Cooperation for Sustainable Energy Security: A Report of the 
Global Dialogue between the European Union and the United States.207  This report dealt 
with208: (1) the dilemmas of climate change, (2) the hazards of energy shortage and 
policies for existing energy sanctuary, (3) confronts in the world financial system and 
latest scenes of global economic governance and, (4) the requirement for logical junction 
and the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Strategy.209  Understanding the goals of the EU 
is necessary since it will affect each member state’s national security and economy,  
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Internet in turn affects the EU as a whole including the cost of protecting the assets. The 
global economy is in a downturn, Internet causes national budgets to be restricted, and it 
will be difficult to fund the goals stated above.  
 The EU has taken initial steps to reduce its own dependence on oil but there needs 
to be a transatlantic community to focus on energy strategies, markets, institutions, study 
and progress, standards and regulations, security of infrastructure, and reaction to 
distractions. 210  This could help launch the international organizations that the EU could 
work with to support efforts for utilizing alternative energy sources. 
 A regular forum still needs to be established that would include the United States 
and the member states of the EU and NATO. It would focus on the issues of energy 
safety, improvement of weather alteration, and financial viability and entire energy 
sources to comply with those points. Under consideration is the Transatlantic Forum on 
Energy Cooperation (TFEC).211  It is under this arm with the partnership with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the EU could rebuild and spread its 
nuclear infrastructure, fund works to promote safe nuclear power, and provide incentives 
and tax policies to promote nuclear power.  
Then there is the point of the EU’s dependence on Russia for natural gas. Even if 
the EU strengthened its member states’ nuclear energy programs, the Central and Eastern 
European states would still rely on Russia for enriched uranium and waste disposal since 
there are treaties in place already. If EU members agreed to an electrical depository, who 
would supervise the management and distribution of members’ deposits and withdrawals 
and pay for the electricity?  Further research is needed.  
If the EU managed its own electrical grid and was not as dependent on Russian oil 
and gas, would this action alienate Russia even more? There are implications since 
Russia maintains the world’s largest deposits of natural gas and is a chief exporter of 
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other fossil fuels to most of Europe.  Today, Russia has the natural gas that most of the 
EU needs; therefore, it has a strong influence.    
If the EU can work through the issues and complexity of nuclear power for 
electricity, it will gain independence in many other areas. When a community has a 
secure, reliable and economical energy source, it can then divert its attention to other 
things. When it breaks its dependence on importing foreign oil, it has different choices to 
make in the international forum of diplomacy.  
G.  IMPACT ON EUROPE’S DOMESTIC REALM 
While nuclear power can be one of the components of energy to meet Europe’s 
electrical needs, it may bring domestic disturbance, undermining national security 
interests. Europe has seen protests against nuclear power, with volumes of people 
protesting, and accompanying violence, that the U.S. has not yet witnessed in recent 
years.  The difference of protest groups between the U.S. and Europe is evident. In the 
U.S. there was a protest regarding the re-licensing on one of Vermont’s nuclear power 
plants.  Two anti-nuclear organizations, Greenpeace USA and Earth First, targeted the 
Vermont complex.  Earth First protestors entered the Vermont Public Service Board 
offices in Montpelier, Vermont, dressed like Santa Clause and elves, demanding that the  
Vermont Public Service Board not renew the nuclear plant license. They were not 
arrested but fined $800 for damages caused to the offices.212  The protest garnered a 
dozen or so people, dressed in costumes.    
1.  Protestors 
In Europe, there have been protests of transportation of nuclear waste in Germany 
and France.  This has not been a new protest since “The German government suspended 
transports in 1998 out of safety concerns. Part of the security concern is of the 
contentious protests and fights between protestors and police in connection with the 
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transportation activities.”213  However, in 2001 transportation of Germany’s nuclear 
waste began again. This was also marked with protests, including protestors vandalizing 
railway facilities in Berlin.214 Again, in November 2008, there were protests against the 
transportation of nuclear waste but with significantly larger numbers of protestors. One of 
the flashpoints of the protest is near the city of Gorleben, Germany; this location stores 
German nuclear waste before movement to the French reprocessing center.  The 
protestors tried to suspend the train’s schedule, presumably to terminate the shipment 
entirely from the initial departure from Germany to France.   
Amid various methods, protestors even chained themselves to the tracks.  “Police 
used water cannons, tear gas and batons to break up the protestors; and riot officers 
carried them away one by one.”215  Although the train did eventually make it to its initial 
French destination in La Hague it was delayed by 13 hours.216  After its departure for 
Gorleben, Germany, protesters were able to suspend the train’s travel by 20 hours 
through various means. These methods used by the Protestors included placing wooden 
barricades across the tracks and setting fire to them. Tractors blocked the entrance to the 
storage facility with people chained to cement barriers made by their fellow protestors.  
In an earlier section of the train tracks protestors had sealed their arms in cement blocks 
under the tracks.217   One protestor was killed in the protests.  He chained himself to the 
railroad tracks along with approximately 12 others.  When the train rounded a corner, at a 
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much slower speed due to a bend in the track, the group moved off of the tracks with the 
exception of one person who was killed when the train struck him.218   
 These protests are in the wake of political wrangling in recent years, in Germany, 
regarding the phasing out of Germany’s 17 nuclear reactors.  In 2001, The Atomic Exit 
Law was passed, whose aim was to phase out the 17 nuclear reactors by 2021.  The 
political landscape has changed since German Chancellor Merkel is leaning toward 
stopping the shut-down of the nuclear reactors, Internet currently provide 25 percent of 
Germany’s electricity.  Chancellor Merkel “argues it is unrealistic in the face of high oil 
costs, [it] will endanger renewable energy goals and will leave Germany vulnerable to the 
whims of its largest gas supplier, Russia.”219  One of the goals of the law was to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent.  However, with few alternative choices to power 
Germany’s electrical needs, nuclear power may exist longer.   
2.  European Neighbors 
Germany’s neighbors have already faced similar prospects.  “Countries such as 
France, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and the UK are already eyeing nuclear power to help 
them meet emissions reductions targets, leaving Germany isolated among its EU and G-8 
partners.”220   Despite the realities of Germany’s future energy woes without nuclear 
power, not all German citizens are in favor of changing the Atomic Exit Law.  In 
September 2009, 50,000 people and more driving 400 farm tractors flocked to the 
German Reichstag in Berlin, in protest of the potential roll-back of the bill.221  Also 
demanded by the protestors was closure of the proposed nuclear waste storage facility at 
Gorleben, Germany.222  The protestors were not stationary, even in their vast numbers.  
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The protest began at the Berlin train station and traveled 2 kilometers to the Brandenburg 
Gate.223  That the protest organizers were able to move 50,000 protestors and 400 tractors 
that distance, in central Berlin, shows the European antinuclear protestor leadership’s 
strong organizational abilities. 
 The other states mentioned are also not without their fair share of protestors.  
Greenpeace released a press release on 19 November 2009, titled “Nuclear Madness 
Reaches Finland.”  Greenpeace activists had unlawfully boarded a cargo ship, sailing 
from France to Finland.  On board the ship, its cargo contained steam-powered generators 
built in France that were to be used in construction of a nuclear reactor in Olkiluoto, 
Finland.  Six Greenpeace activists boarded the ship on 16 November, and two more 
boarded the ship the next day, 17 November 2009.  Their goal was to gain media 
attention for their cause, Internet was protesting the construction of the nuclear reactor in 
Finland.  The Greenpeace activists were from Finland, France, Germany and Sweden.224  
 In July 2008, Greenpeace activists climbed the Eiffel Tower in Paris, France, and 
attached onto the Eiffel tower a large banner with a nuclear symbol.  This was in direct 
correlation to Paris hosting the EU members.  Furthermore, on the Eiffel Tower were the 
EU stars, Internet signified “France’s six-month term as EU president.”225   Greenpeace 
believes that France’s President Nicholas Sarkozy was using the EU summit to promote 
his agenda of more nuclear-generated electricity.  Sarkozy was hosting over 40 heads of 
state and government in Paris for a summit on the partnership between the European 
Union and countries from the Mediterranean region.226  Greenpeace accused Sarkozy of 
selling Areva (France’s nuclear power company) nuclear power abilities to the UN and 
G8.227  According to Greenpeace, Sarkozy’s government has signed agreements with 
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nine other nations in the Mediterranean region, to build Areva nuclear reactors in their 
nations.228  In early July 2008, Sarkozy announced that France would build a second-
generation European Pressurized Reactor (EPR).229  Other EPRs are under construction 
in Finland and France.  The Finland EPR is located at Olkiluoto, where the steam-
powered generators were headed when their ship was boarded by Greenpeace enroute. 230  
 Europe’s monumental number of protestors converged on a single objective as a 
nuclear power plant in the spring of 2009.  They targeted France’s oldest nuclear power 
plant, Internet is located in Colmar, France.  People, from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and Switzerland rallied outside the Colmar nuclear power plant, insisting that it is too old 
to maintain safe operations.  Over 10,000 people from these countries attended the 
rally.231  While this group of protestors was outside the Colmar plant, 3,500 persons 
protested the Fessenheim nuclear power station.  The Colmar protest was met by 3,000 
police officers, along with “dozens of anti-riot police vehicles and trucks with water 
cannons.”232  Protestors alleged that police agencies prevented them from boarding their 
trains while en route.233    
 The examples listed previously, except for Finland, were the Western states with a 
reliable electrical grid that currently meets it requirements. The potential for protests and 
violence is greater in the newer eastern states that do not have reliable electrical grids that 
cannot meet their electrical requirements to begin with and that must make tough choices. 
The decision may force these states to both not meet their treaty requirement of 
decommissioning their Soviet-era reactors and do nothing to replace them leaving, them 
entirely dependent on Russia for oil and coal to run other electrical plants or provide 
electricity using the reactors keeping domestic stabilization. The implications for these 
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states could be that not having nuclear power electric plants reduces their national 
security, Internet will reduce growth in their domestic economies due to high energy 
costs and could even destabilize governments through domestic turmoil and unrest of 
their own citizens.  
H.  SUMMARY 
 In closing, the EU and the rest of Europe face difficult problems of energy that 
vary from the ones tackled by the United States and will lead to a different solution set 
for them. They have taken the first step and identified the problem; they are beginning to 
work at the EU level on strategic plans to meet energy goals and objectives. They are 
looking at solutions based on known technology and electrical output, and they have 
started to consider protecting those assets that cross boundaries, treaties, and 
governments.   
The conclusion chapter focuses on policy recommendations that United States can 
focus on today in the areas of energy strategy, streamlining the levels of bureaucracy, and 
create incentives to build new plants and expand the nuclear power industry. There are 
two areas that need further study, as they are too broad in scope to address in this paper. 
The first, potential attacks against nuclear power plants; the second area of in depth study 








Whether it’s nuclear energy, or solar or wind energy, if we fail to invest in 
the technologies of tomorrow, then we’re going to be importing those 
technologies instead of exporting them.  We will fall behind.  Jobs will be 
produced overseas, instead of here in the United States of America.  And 
that's not a future that I accept. 
—President Obama, February 16, 2010 at Remarks by the President on 
Energy in Lanham, Maryland 
 
This thesis was written to help understand that all nuclear reactors are inherently 
dangerous but can be used safely and the industry is growing outside of the United States. 
This paper hopes to establish that nuclear power plants can both satisfy the U.S.’ energy 
needs and do so in a way that reduces or eliminates the security risks posed by its current 
reliance on fossil fuels.   
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FORMAT  
 In Chapter VII, The Difference of the Europe’s Issues with Nuclear Power Plants, 
a first step for at least the European Union was to start planning at a strategic level on an 
energy strategy. President Obama has taken the initial steps in creating such a strategy 
but the strategy will need to continue and grow and be refined by future executive 
administrations.  
1. Well-planned Energy Strategy 
The United States has taken key steps in creating a viable energy strategy. The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included $80 billion dollars for energy invest 
and job creation. 234 Then, there is the investment of $150 billion into energy 
                                                 
234 “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary 
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technologies and loan guarantees on new nuclear power reactors in Georgia creating a 
business partnership between the private sector and the federal government.  
The federal government plays a key role in domestic energy policy.  President 
Obama focuses on breaking the U.S. dependence on oil. Policies are now focused on 
producing more energy within the U.S. and linkage to promoting energy efficiency in all 
sectors of American society.235  
One of the indicators of a successful government is good bureaucracy. The 
concept of Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and private sector working together and overlapping in many 
ways beneficial to the industry and the safety of the American public.  
2.  Level of Bureaucracy 
Based on the research conducted for this paper it would seem the role and 
responsibly of key agencies will require streamlining. This will limit the problems 
between government regulatory enforcement and the private sector. It also reinforces the 
concept that it is all agencies responsibility to ensure the physical and IT sectors are 
protected, accounted for, and congressional oversight that only strengthen the long term 
goals of security of the plants.  
The European Union has already shown that it can promote growth in the industry 
through regulation and agreement. However, the EU’s weakness is that it has no money 
to assist members in upgrading, decommissioning, and regulating nuclear power plants. 
The United States may consider some of the incentives that the EU created and then 
follow suit with federal funding to expand the nuclear power industry within the U.S.  
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3. Create Incentives  
There needs to be government regulation, legislation, and taxation to generate 
revenue to finance incentives to encourage new competition in the industry. The long 
term benefits should be more companies providing electricity, lower costs to the 
consumer, and new technologies developed.  
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1.  Potential Attacks Against Nuclear Power Plants  
This paper has indentified the two categories: attacks against the physical 
structure of the nuclear power plant and cyber attacks. Each of these areas deserves 
further research and analysis to counter each attack.  
2. DHS  
DHS had been strongly criticized by the GAO and others that it has not addressed 
its responsibilities with respect to securing critical infrastructure and key federal 
operations against cyber-threats. Further study needs to be conducted to access a 
reasonable plan and execution of that plan to ensure that cyber security goals are met.  
C.  SUMMARY 
The short-term goal of nuclear energy should be to break the United States 
dependency on foreign oil imports. The long-term goal is to create several alternative 
energy sources that will enable the U.S. to continue to grow economically and yet ensure 
National Security.  
Energy is vital to any industrialized nation and with competition of new and 
upcoming economies of other nations, oil will continue to be an important commodity;  
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